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Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(1), a complete list of the 
parties in the trial court is as follows: 
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Susanne Q. Price 
Kent Swensen 
Kay Swensen 
Ross Larrabee 
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Defendants 
National Railroad Passenger Corporation 
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City of South Jordan, an incorporated City of the State of Utah 
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah 
Code. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Issue: Did the district court correctly hold that the City had no duty to provide 
different or additional warning devices at the crossing? 
B. Issue: Is the district court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the 
City proper because the City is immune under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act? 
C. Issue: Is the district court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the 
City proper because plaintiffs failed to establish any causal comiection between the claimed 
improper signing and the accident? 
Standard of Review: Summary judgment presents questions of law and is reviewed 
for correctness. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994). 
D. Issue: Did the district court properly strike the affidavit of Archie Burnham? 
Standard of Review: The district court found that the Affidavit of Mr. Burnham was 
irrelevant and inadmissible; presumably, unlielpful to the court. To the extent that the 
court's ruling on the affidavit dealt with the admissibility of expert testimony, the standard 
of review is abuse of discretion, Gerbich v. Numed, Inc., 977 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1999). 
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Preservation of Issues: The issue of the lower court's granting summary judgment 
was preserved in the City's Motion for Summary Judgment, and various memoranda filed 
in support and in opposition thereto, and the district court's Memorandum Decision and 
Order Granting the City's Motion (R. 1258), and Judgment of Dismissal of the City 
(R. 1310). 
The district court's granting of the Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Mr. Burnham was 
preserved in the City's Motion to Strike the Affidavit, the various memoranda filed in 
support and in opposition thereto, and by the Order Granting the Motion to Strike Affidavits 
(R. 1307). 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in District Court 
The appellants are the parents of three teenagers who were killed when Brent 
Laixabee drove in front of an Amtrak passenger train at a crossing in the City of South Jordan 
on New Year's Eve, 1995. 
The Larrabee vehicle was the second vehicle in a three-car caravan. The other two 
vehicles were occupied by teenage friends of the decedents, and they were all on their way 
to a New Year's Eve party. As they approached the railroad crossing they passed several 
warning signs, and at the crossing itself were a stop sign and a railroad crossing "crossbuck." 
At Addendum A is a diagram of the area (not to scale) depicting, generally, the 
relative locations of roads, tracks, signs, and the order of the cars in the caravan and who 
occupied each vehicle. 
2 
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The first car in the caravan, driven by Jacque Zimmerman, stopped at the crossing. 
She drove across the tracks when the train was so close that its headlight lit up the right side 
of her car. Larrabee was right behind. He pulled up, stopped, and then pulled out in front 
of the train, and was struck. The occupants of the third vehicle watched the accident occur 
in front of them. Several occupants in the third vehicle saw and heard the train well in 
advance of the accident. The drivers and occupants in the first and third vehicles testified 
that they knew there was a crossing, they could see the stop sign and crossbuck, and 
accordingly, they stopped. 
The parents claim that the City should be liable because there was some deficiency 
widi the existing signs, that additional unspecified signs should have been installed, that the 
City should have installed active1 devices (train-activated lights and gates), or closed the 
road. 
After discoveiy, the City filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that 
the City was immune, had no duty to install any particular type of sign, and that plaintiffs 
had not established causation. 
In response to the City's Motion, appellants filed the affidavit of Archie Burnham. 
Defendants moved to strike the affidavit because it was vague, conclusory, speculative, 
unsupported by any specific facts, and failed to meet the requirements of Rule 56(e), 
U.R.C.P. 
luActive devices" are train-activated lights/gates which tell a driver that a train is 
in or near the crossing. "Passive devices," which were in place, tell a driver that there 
is a crossing, and the driver is to then stop and yield to trains. 
3 
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After briefing and hearing, The Honorable Anne Stirba granted the City's motions, 
and Judgment of Dismissal was signed on May 2, 1999 (R. 1310), and an Order signed 
striking the affidavit of Archie Burnham on May 28, 1999 (R. 1307). This appeal followed. 
Tlie City specifically disagrees with two assertions made initially by appellants in the 
"Nature of the Case" section of their brief at page 4, and repeated multiple times in their 
brief. One statement is simply false, and the other is sheer speculation. 
The false statement is that the warning devices at the crossing "consisted of old and 
faded pavement markings, a partially obscured crossbuck sign, and a stop sign," implying 
that the signs were not visible. However, it is undisputed that all signs were present and 
visible on tlie night of tlie accident. While the pavement markings were not brand new, they 
were visible. Photographs of the scene (Addenda B and C) disprove appellants' claim that 
the crossing was inadequately signed. 
Tlie speculative statement is that Brent Larrabee drove out in front of the train because 
"he was unaware of the approaching train . . . ." How Brent Larrabee could have been 
unaware of the train is puzzling, since the train headlight lit up the right side of the 
Zimmerman vehicle as it went over the tracks right in front of him, and the train was also 
being watched, and heard, by the occupants of the third vehicle. Nevertheless, no one knows 
whether Brent Larrabee looked and did not see the train, saw it and thought he could beat it, 
saw it and misjudged its speed and/or distance, did not look at all, or simply blindly followed 
the Zimmerman car; to claim otherwise is mere conjecture. What is known for sure is that 
he was faced with a stop sign and railroad crossbuck, and came to a complete stop at a 
ninety-degree angle to the track before pulling in front of the train. 
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IV. APPELLANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The City agrees, partially, with the appellants' Statement of Facts. The City will set 
forth those facts with which it agrees, those with which it disagrees, and those additional 
facts the City believes are needed for resolution of this appeal. 
"The Collision." The City does not take issue with the facts set forth in paragraphs 
1 through 6 in the "The Collision" section of appellants' Statement of Facts, except in 
paragraph 6, where appellants speculate that Brent Larrabee "[apparently not seeing the 
approaching train . . . began across the tracks." 
"The Train Crew's Actions." The City does not take issue with paragraphs 7 
through 10 in the "The Train Crew's Actions" section of appellants' Statement of Facts. 
"The Ultra-Hazardous Condition at the Crossing." The City takes issue with 
paragraphs 11 through 13 of the "The Ultra-Hazardous Condition at the Crossing" section 
of appellants' Statement of Facts, in the following particulars: 
In paragraph 11, appellants state that the district court assumed in its Memorandum 
Decision that the crossing was ultra hazardous, as if that were some sort of finding. 
However, a review of the court's Decision makes it clear that the court was simply reciting 
an assumption to that effect by die railroads, not the City. The railroads' argument was that 
whether the crossing was ultra hazardous or not, they had no legal duty and they simply 
assumed, for the purpose of ilieir motions, tha' the crossing was ultra hazardous. 
In paragraph 12, appellants set forth evidence which they claim supports their notion 
that the crossing was ultra hazardous. Most of their "evidence," however, consists of the 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
unsubstantiated, conclusory statements of Mr. Burnham, and is proven false by the 
photographs of the signs, hi paragraph 12(b) of plaintiffs' Statement of Facts they claim that 
the configuration of the crossing is such that a driver's visibility of northbound trains is 
highly restricted, and that the trains overtake northbound vehicles from behind and at an 
awkward angle; however, it is clear that the road turns and crosses the tracks at a ninety-
degree angle, which is proven by the photographs of the crossing. There is no citation for 
the proposition that visibility problems are compounded because the track is elevated, and 
the photographs prove the contrary. 
Paragraph 12(c) is fiction: that the stop sign and crossbuck were not visible, the 
warning signs were not properly reflectorized, and the stop ahead sign was improperly 
located. The sole citation to the record is to the Affidavit of Archie Burnham, which does 
not support the notion that the signs were "not properly reflectorized," or that the stop ahead 
sign was improperly located. 
In paragraph 13, appellants cite yet more "evidence" for the ultra-hazardous nature 
of the crossing. As to the accident occurring some sixty years ago, there is no evidence that 
the circumstances were substantially similar to the facts of the instant accident. The more 
recent accident history indicates only that there were seven incidents at the crossing over a 
fifteen-year period; however, there is no foundation in Mr. Burnham's affidavit to support 
the notion that the accident frequency was greater than what would normally be expected. 
The UDOT Design Study Report prepared in 1984 (R. 1412, Ex. 17) did not even determine 
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a hazard index for the crossing, which the UDOT would calculate in order to prioritize funds 
to pay for crossing improvements.2 
"Failure to Upgrade the Crossings Warning Devices," Paragraph 15 relies on the 
Burnham Affidavit, and is proven false by the photographs. 
Paragraph 16 is partially true. At times it has been recognized that it would be 
preferable to install active warnings at the crossing. What appellants fail to acknowledge, 
however, is that by 1992 it was agreed that the crossing would not be upgraded with active 
crossing devices, but rather, additional signs would be placed, and that after the grade 
separation was completed at 10600 South and a new frontage road built, the crossing at 
10200 would be closed. See Affidavit of Gordon Haight (R. 179-184), and exhibits thereto, 
including results of a surveillance review (R. 185-186), letter from UDOT to South Jordan 
confirming that South Jordan would install advance warning signs and pavement markings 
in 1992 (and not active devices) (R. 190, Addendum D), and the Agenda and Raihoad Status 
Report (R. 192-194, Addendum D) prepared by the UDOT in October 1995, setting forth the 
status of the railroad crossing as of the date of the accident: 
The I-15/Railroad Study is complete. An overpass will be placed at 10600 
South. When the new railroad grade and the 10600 South overpass is 
2See also, UDOT's letter to all cities and counties dated September 7, 1993 (R. 
1412, Ex. 29). In part, the letter states: 
UDOT only receives enough federal fimds for the upgrading of about five 
crossings a year [out of 1,300+ public crossings]. At that rate, it would 
take over 200 years to upgrade all of the existing public crossings. The 
railroad crossings that are upgraded with federal funds are determined by the 
use of a "high accident prediction formula." UDOT cannot randomly select 
any crossing desired by special interest groups. 
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complete, an at-grade crossing will be placed at about 10400 or 10500 South, 
and the 10200 South crossing will be closed. Until then, this project is on 
hold. 
Paragraph 17 purports to set forth the chronology of events leading to the collision. 
The City takes issue with several assertions therein. 
Paragraph 17(a) states that the UDOT "recommends" to the City that active warning 
devices be installed. Actually, the referenced document merely sets forth two possible 
alternatives: installing automatic gates, or closing the crossing and providing an access road 
at 10000 South, which would not have gates or flashing lights. Hardly a "recommendation." 
(R. 949-951). 
Paragraph 17(b) states that the City agrees to the UDOT's recommendations. The 
reference to the record, however, refers only to an Agenda and Minutes of the City Planning 
Commission, which apparently voted to recommend to the City Council that flashing lights 
be installed, but that gates were not necessaiy (R. 955). However, there is no evidence that 
the City Council ever adopted the recommendation of the Planning Commission or the 
"recommendation" of the UDOT. 
Subparagraphs (c) through (k) refer to correspondence and documents which establish 
only that the crossing had received attention from the Utah Department of Transportation, 
South Jordan City, the Federal Highway Administration, and the railroads. It is true that 
there had been discussions about realigning the crossing, installing active warning devices, 
or even closing the crossing. What the appellants fail to point out, however, is that by 1992 
the idea of installing lights and gates had been abandoned. The letter from the City 
Administrator to the UDOT dated July 28, 1992, summarizes the situation as it existed from 
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then to the date of the accident: the City intends to eventually vacate the crossing. A new 
frontage road will be built in phases over the next five years (through 1997). An underpass 
will be constructed at 10600 South. The City intends to vacate 10200 South, is considering 
a new crossing at 10500 South, and understands that the City will need to pay for some of 
the cost of the new crossing. In the meantime, the City has "completed the additional 
signage and warnings at the crossing to temporarily help the situation." (R. 1412, Ex. 7; 
R. 987-988, Addendum D). That was also the status of the crossing as of the time of the 
accident (R. 192-194). 
Paragraph 17(1) purports to be a summary of the letter referred to in the foregoing 
paragraph. Plaintiffs misstate the facts, however, claiming that the letter was an 
acknowledgment for the need for additional warning signs. In fact, the letter confirms that 
the additional signs previously recommended by the UDOT had already been installed. 
Paragraph 17(m) refers to a letter from the UDOT to the City in October 1992. The 
UDOT is not "pleading" with the City to install additional warning signs. In fact, it is clear 
that the additional warning signs had already been installed, and in any event, it is clear from 
the photographs that advance warning signs were present at the time of the accident. 
Paragraph 17(n) has no citation to the record. However, it is true that no active 
warning devices were even installed. It is untrue that no improvements to the passive devices 
were ever made, since it is undisputed that advance warning signs and pavement markings 
were installed prior to the accident. See photographs (R. 774-778) of the signs identified by 
the investigating officer at R. 803-809, the photographs (Addendum C). In addition, 
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photographs taken by an investigator from the Federal Raihoad Administration the day after 
the accident are found at R. 205-209 (Addendum B). 
Paragraph 18 may be true, but is irrelevant to any issues presented in this appeal. 
"Disputed Material Facts." In paragraph 20, appellants dispute that the signs were 
visible the night of the collision, and rely, as usual, on the suspect Affidavit of Archie 
Burnham. It is, however, beyond dispute that the signs were visible because: 
1. The photographs taken shortly after the accident show that the 
signs and pavement markings were in place and visible. The testimony of 
Officer CaiTuth and City Engineer Haight in that regard are not disputed. 
Respectively, R. 803-809 and 179-209. Photographs show the approach to the 
crossing, and the crossing itself, at R. 205-209, and R. 774-778, and the 
authenticity of the photographs is not in dispute. At Addendum B are five 
photographs (Exhibits 3-7) identified by Officer Carruth. All of the photos 
except Exhibit 7 are taken by him through the windshield of his patrol car. 
Exhibit 3 is taken northbound and shows the forty mile-an-hour speed limit 
sign. Exhibit 4 shows the reverse turn sign and, in the background, the 
raihoad advance warning sign and the stop sign ahead warning sign. Exhibit 
5 is a closer view of the raihoad advance warning sign and the stop sign 
advance warning sign. Pavement markings can be seen in the vicinity of the 
raihoad advance warning sign. Exhibit 6 shows what a driver would see as he 
makes the turn to approach the crossing. The stop sign and railroad crossbuck 
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are clearly visible, and neither is obscured. Exhibit 7 is taken looking south, 
the direction from which the train came. The police car is stopped pointing 
eastbound, similar to the cars in the caravan. The sides, or edges, of the 
crossbucks and the stop sign can be seen immediately in front of the police 
car. 
The photographs taken by the investigator from the Federal Railroad 
Administration are found at Addendum C, and identified in the Affidavit of 
Gordon Haight (R. 179-209). At R. 205, photograph No. 1 is looking 
northbound and shows the reverse turn sign with the advance warning signs 
in the background. Photograph 2, at R. 205, is a closer view of the railroad 
advance crossing sign, with associated pavement marking. The stop sign 
advance sign is seen in the backgiound. Photograph 4 at R. 207 is closer view 
of the "stop sign ahead" warning sign, and the stop sign and crossbuck can be 
seen in the backgiound. Photograph 5, at R. 206, is taken just before a vehicle 
would turn to go east and cross the tracks. The stop sign and crossbucks are 
visible in the right portion of the photograph. Photograph 7, at R. 207, shows 
the stop sign and crossbucks as one makes the turn to go east. Photograph 8, 
at R. 209, is taken on the west side of the tracks, looking south. The crossbuck 
and the edge of the stop sign are seen in the left foreground. Photograph 10, 
at R. 209, is looking south down the track from the center of the crossing, in 
the direction from which the train came. 
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2. The testimony of the surviving caravan participants is contrary 
to appellants' claim. They all saw the stop sign at the crossing and nobody 
was confused. 
Jacque Zimmerman, the driver of the first car, stopped at the stop sign 
and recalled both the stop sign and the crossbuck (R. 1413, pp. 37, 58). 
Jacob Wattleworth was in the back seat of the Zimmerman Honda. 
While it was stopped at the crossing he could see the stop sign and crossbuck 
(R. 1414, p. 55). 
Lindsey Hackett was in the front passenger seat of Zimmerman's 
Honda. When they stopped at the crossing she could see the stop sign and the 
railroad crossing sign, and there was no question in her mind that they were 
at a railroad crossing (R. 1415, pp. 22-23, R. 921-922). 
Whitney Hill was driving the third vehicle in the caravan behind the 
Larrabee vehicle. She saw the Zimmerman car stop at the stop sign (R. 1416, 
pp. 25-28). 
Abram Sant was in the front passenger's seat of the third vehicle. He 
knew there was a crossing, and recalls the advance warning signs and the 
painted railroad crossing warning on the pavement (R. 1419, pp. 31, 43-44, R. 
393,394-395). 
Melinda McCullough was in the back seat of the third vehicle. She 
recalls seeing the crossbuck, stop sign, and an advance warning sign, all of 
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which were in place the night of the accident (R. 1418, pp. 20-21, R. 517-518). 
Subparagraphs 21(a), (b) and (c) recite statements made at one time or another by 
either the UDOT or the City, recognizing that the at-grade crossing was hazardous or in need 
of improvement. However, the photographs rebut the claim that there was a "very bad 
crossing angle" and poor sight distances. As is obvious from the photographs, a northbound 
train could be seen for many blocks to the south, and it is undisputed that the road crossed 
the track at a ninety-degree angle. See, e.g., the photographs and Deposition of Melinda 
McCullough (R. 1418, pp. 20-24). 
Subparagraphs 21(d) and (e) constitute conjecture and speculation. Brent Larrabee 
stopped for three seconds at the crossing and then pulled out in front of the train. Appellants 
claim the only reasonable inference is that he could not see the train; however, the plaintiffs 
never explain why. In any event, inattentiveness or recklessness on the part of the first or 
second driver in the caravan proves nothing about the adequacy of the warning devices. All 
they were designed to do was to advise a driver of the fact of a railroad crossing, and make 
a driver stop, which they did. 
Paragraph 22 is simply a rehash of the appellants' usual arguments, rebutted by the 
testimony of the witnesses and the photographs. 
Paragraphs 23-26 are irrelevant to any issues in this appeal involving the City. 
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V. CITY'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The Accident Scene and Warning Signs 
1. The accident occurred at the crossing of 300 West and the railroad track at 
about 10200 South. 300 West is a frontage road mnning generally north and south, west of 
Interstate 15. From 10600 South, north for four blocks to 10200 South, it runs along the west 
side of the railroad track. At 10200 South, the road turns right for a short distance, crosses 
the track at a ninety-degree angle, and then turns left and proceeds north, to the east of the 
railroad track. At Addendum A is a rough diagram of the vicinity. 
2. The caravan proceeded north on 300 West. In order, the signs which were 
tliere to be seen, up to the railroad crossing, were (a) a white-and-black 40 mph speed limit 
sign; (b) a reverse turn sign; (c) an advance railroad crossing sign (round, yellow-and-black, 
with a cross and two capital Rs thereon); at about the same location advance railroad 
crossing warning pavement markings were painted on the asphalt; (d) advance stop sign 
warning sign (yellow warning sign with depiction of stop sign with arrow pointing forward); 
(e) red reflectorized stop sign, with stop line pavement marking at Hie crossing; and (f) white-
and-black reflectorized crossbucks at the crossing. 
The investigating officer, Jack Carruth, identified each of the foregoing signs, which 
are depicted in Exhibits 3 through 7 of his deposition (found at Addendum B). All of the 
signs referred to were in place and visible on the night of the accident (Carruth Depo. 
R. 1420, pp. 57-64, 74-79, R.804-809; Affidavit of Gordon Haight, R. 179-209, p. 180); 
identifying photos taken by Federal Railroad Administration (found at Addendum C). 
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All of the signs and markings are appropriate to warn traffic approaching a railroad 
crossing, and are specifically recognized and authorized by the Manual on Uniform Traffic 
Control Devices promulgated by the Federal Highway Administration (the "MUTCD"), and 
which has been adopted for use upon highways within the State of Utah by § 41-6-20, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953) (Affidavit of Gordon Haight, R. 183, found at Addendum C). 
B. Effectiveness of the Warning Signs 
The warning signs in place on the night of the accident constituted a "passive traffic 
control system." Its sole purpose is to identify and direct a driver's attention to the location 
of a grade crossing, so the driver can take appropriate action, i.e., stopping and looking for 
trains (R. 179-184, 195-204). In that respect, the signs worked, since the drivers and 
passengers of the first and third cars in the caravan have testified that they knew there was 
a crossing, they could see the stop sign and crossbuck, and they all stopped. 
C. Testimony of Drivers and Passengers of Vehicles 
Jacque Zimmerman was driving the first car in the Caravan, a Honda. She pulled 
up and stopped at the stop sign, and then started across the tracks. While on the tracks she 
saw the train coming from her right (R. 1413, p. 37). She saw the lights of the train on the 
side of her car (R. 1413, p. 38). She was generally familiar with the advance warning signs 
for northbound traffic; she has no recollection of any signs missing. She recalls the stop sign 
and the crossbuck at the crossing (R. 1413, pp. 56-58). 
Jacob Wattleworth was in the back seat of Jacque Zimmerman's Honda. Jacque 
pulled up to the stop sign at the crossing and stopped at a right angle. He looked up and 
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down the tracks and did not see a train (R. 1414, pp. 20-22, R. 919-921). Jacque then pulled 
forward onto the tracks and at that time, he noticed the train because the train headlights 
suddenly illuminated the side of Jacque's car (p. 22, R. 921). At that time, he looked to his 
right and saw the train (p. 23, R. 922). Jacque then sped up across the tracks to get out of 
the way (p. 24. R. 923). While Jacque was stopped at the crossing, he could see the stop sign 
and crossbuck (p. 55). 
Lindsey Hackett was in the front passenger seat of Jacque's Honda (R. 1415, p. 15). 
Jacque pulled up and stopped at tlie stop sign at tlie crossing (p. 21, R. 921-922). While they 
were stopped at the crossing, she could see the stop sign and the railroad crossing sign. 
There was no question in her mind that they were at a railroad track (pp. 22-23, R. 921-922). 
She saw Jacque look both ways and then she pulled onto the tracks (pp. 24-25, R. 923). 
Lindsey looked to her right and saw a light on the track; it took her a couple of seconds to 
realize it was a train and it was too close for comfort (R. 1415, pp. 25-26, 40). 
Whitney Hill was driving the third vehicle (R. 1416, p. 12). At about halfway 
between 10600 South and the accident scene, Becky Knapp mentioned that there was a train, 
and Whitney turned and looked and saw the train, and heard the train's air Jiorn as it went 
through tlie crossing at 10600 South (R. 919-921). She saw the Zimmerman car stop at the 
stop sign and tlie Larrabee car stop right behind it. She saw the Zimmerman car drive slowly 
over the tracks, and also again noticed the train. The Larrabee car stopped, or almost 
stopped, and then followed the Zimmerman car over the tracks and was hit by the train. 
Whitney would not have driven onto the tracks when Zimmerman did (R. 1416, pp. 25-28). 
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Abram Sant was in the front passenger seat of Whitney Hill's Jeep (R. 1419, p. 12.) 
The three vehicles all arrived at the crossing at about the same time. The Tempo driven by 
Brent Larrabee came to a complete stop (p. 26, R. 388). The Larrabee vehicle then rolled 
rather slowly onto the tracks and then he saw it leap forward, however, it was then hit by the 
train (pp. 28-29, R. 390-391). As they were driving north on 300 West, he heard the train 
horn, apparently at it approached the 10600 South crossing. He looked back and saw the 
train and could see its headlights (pp. 23-24, R. 385-386). He was aware of the train all the 
way up to the time of the collision. At the time Brent Larrabee took off across the tracks, 
Abram could see the train and it was close enough he knew there was danger of a collision 
(p. 56, R. 403). He knew there was a crossing and was familiar with the advance warning 
signs. He recalls seeing the painted railroad crossing warning on the pavement (p. 31, 
R. 393). 
Rebecca Knapp was in the back seat of the Jeep. As they drove west on 10600 
South, she looked to the south as they crossed the railroad tracks and saw the train coming 
about a half a mile away. She saw a big light (R. 1417, pp. 18-20, R. 638, 724-725). As 
they drove north on 300 West she observed the train coming north towards the crossing 
where the accident occurred (pp. 45-46, R. 733). She had no trouble seeing the train coming 
all the way from 10600 South all the way up to the accident scene. There were no 
obstructions to her view of the train as it approached the crossing (p. 47, R. 734). She saw 
both the Zimmerman and Larrabee cars drive onto the track. She could see the train coming 
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and could not think of any reason why Jacque Zimmerman or Brent Larrabee could not see 
the train (R. 1417, pp. 53-55, R. 737-739). 
Melinda McCullough was in the back seat of the Jeep on the passenger side 
(McCullough Depo., p. 17, R. 516). She was familiar with the crossing and knew it was 
protected by a crossbuck and stop sign and an advanced warning sign, all of which were in 
place the night of the accident (pp. 20-21, R. 517-518). A car stopped at the stop sign would 
be pretty much at a 90 degree angle. It is easier to see up and down the track if you are 
closer to the stop sign (pp. 23-24). As they drove north on 300 West, she watched the train 
approach (pp. 27-28, R. 522). She saw the Honda and the Tempo pull up to the crossing. 
The Honda came to almost a complete stop, and the Tempo came to a complete stop for one 
or two seconds. Zimmerman drove on over the tracks and Larrabee pulled up and stopped 
again for perhaps two or three seconds and then drove onto the track in front of the train 
(pp. 33-36, R. 523-526). The light from the train illuminated the side of Zimmerman's car 
as it pulled across (R. 1418, p. 49). She could clearly see the train approaching and does 
not understand why Brent Larrabee or Jacque Zimmerman apparently did not see the train 
(pp. 51-52. R. 530-531). '. . r 
D. Background of the Crossing 
The railroad track was probably constructed in the late 1800s. No one remembers 
exactly when the road was built (Depo. of Richard Warne, R. 1422, p. 110); however, 
railroad records indicate that it has maintained crossbucks at a crossing at that location since 
before 1919 (Depo. of Orlando Miera, R. 1421, pp. 55-56). The crossing was within an 
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unincorporated portion of Salt Lake County until South Jordan City annexed the area in 1979 
(Warne Depo., R. 1422, pp. 13-14, R. 326-327). Since the road was not a state road and was 
within unincorporated Salt Lake County prior to annexation, the road and crossing were 
likely designed and constructed by Salt Lake County. 
With the annexation, the City inherited a number of railroad crossings. The crossing 
in question, along with others, was regularly reviewed and studied. See, for example, letter 
dated May 21, 1990 from James Nelson at the UDOT to Mayor Hutchings and City 
Administrator, Warne, of South Jordan (R. 1412, Exhibit u4"); minutes of surveillance 
review June 30, 1992, indicating that the crossing was inspected and evaluated by Mr. Miera 
of the D&RG Railroad, Mr. Laubsch of the Federal Highway Administration, Messrs. Chang, 
Nelson, and Arambula of the UDOT, and Ms. Witkowski, of the UDOT (R. 1412, 
Exhibit "6"); minutes and agenda of the November 16, 1995 coordinating meeting involving 
UDOT, the Federal Highway Administration, and the Railroad (R. 1412, Exhibit "10"), 
which states: 
The 1-15 railroad study is complete. An overpass will be placed at 10600 
South. When the new railroad grade and the 10600 South overpass is 
complete, an at grade crossing will be placed at about 10400 or 10500 South 
and the 10200 South crossing will be closed. Until then, this project is on 
hold. 
E. The City's Involvement With the Crossing 
Depositions were taken of Richard Warne, who was the City Administrator (City 
Manager) from May 1982 to September 1991; Gordon Haight, who was the City Engineer 
from April 1994 until January 1996; Anthony Murphy, who was the City Administrator 
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from September 1991 until August 1994.; David Millheim, who was the City Administrator 
from January 1995 until August 1998; and Theron Hutchings, who was Mayor from 1986 
until January 1998. 
The testimony of those individuals, as it relates to the crossing, can be summarized 
as follows: the crossing was considered hazardous (Millheim Depo., R. 1424, pp. 71-73), 
just as any other at-grade crossing. The City's only options were to install gates and lights, 
or to close the crossing, effectively closing 300 West from 10600 South to 9000 South. The 
entire area was being developed and a new road was planned for various locations further 
to the west. 
To install train activated gates and lights was not a simple solution: 
(1) It would require the Utah Department of Transportation ranking 
the crossing high enough on the priority list to receive federal funds which 
were only sufficient to install such devices at a half a dozen crossings per year 
in the entire state (Wanie Depo., R. 1422, pp. 105-107) (R. 1412, Exhibit 29); 
(2) All work within the railroad right-of-way is done by the railroad, 
and it may need up to two years to get the project scheduled. (R. 1412, 
Exhibit 33, p. 11); 
(3) Highway design standards would not authorize installation of 
gates and lights at a crossing such as this which had a short, straight approach, 
and additional property would have to be acquired on each side of the track to 
allow for a longer straight approach to the crossing (Haight Depo., R. 1425, 
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pp. 51-54); this would mean that the City would have to buy or condemn 
property and rebuild the road. This was possible, although expensive, on the 
west side of the track. It was not, however, feasible on the east side because 
of the close proximity of the 1-15 right-of-way. Assuming that the 1-15 right-
of-way could be infringed on, simply to realign the road would cost hundreds 
of thousands of dollars, which would be the expense of South Jordan City 
(Haight Depo., R. 1425, pp. 32-35; 50-54) (Millheim Depo., R. 1424, pp. 86-
88); and 
(4) While the UDOT had approved the crossing for installation of 
active control devices, the project had never been funded (Warne Depo., 
R. 1422, pp. 100-102). 
South Jordan did not have funds to spare, and the City officials prioritized their 
expenditures (Hutcliings Depo., R. 1423, p. 17.) That project, which was in part contingent 
on the 1-15 rebuild and constiiiction of a raikoad grade separation at 10600 South, obtaining 
participation of developers, and coordinating with Sandy City (whose City limits were a 
short distance to the north), created a host of political, financial and practical problems which 
resulted in delays in constructing the new frontage road and closing the crossing. 
The City's ultimate plan was to build a new road at 400 or 500 West and close the 
crossing af 10200 South. The new road had not been constructed as of the accident. 
(Hutcliings Depo., R. 1423, pp. 27-30.) It was the City's plan to eventually close the 
crossing and not to spend money on installing gates and lights and reconfiguring the road, 
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which would soon be closed anyway. See Wame Depo., R. 1422, pp. 33-36, 43-45, 86-90; 
Millheim Depo., R. 1424, pp. 44-49. 
Nor was closing the crossing a simple solution, as 300 West had come to be relied on 
by a number of businesses in the area. Closing 300 West diverted traffic to 9000 South, 
causing additional problems there, and significant political problems, as the City learned.3 
At page 41 of their brief, plaintiffs falsely claim that the City had "reneged" on a 
pledge to place "additional passive warning devices" at the crossing in 1992, and cite the 
deposition of Orlando Miera, a Railroad employee. 
However, Mr. Miera, for whatever reason, simply confused the terms "active" and 
"passive," which is clear from a fair reading of his deposition, and the correction sheet that 
he filed thereafter, and it is misleading and unfair of the plaintiffs to claim that Mr. Miera 
testified that the City had never installed any passive warning devices. What he meant to say 
(and what is the fact) is that the City never installed any active crossing devices (Miera 
Depo., R. 1421, pp. 45-46, 108-113; correction sheet dated October 7, 1998). 
Anthony Murphy, the City Administrator in 1992, testified that there was an 
agreement between the City, the Railroad and the UDOT, and discussion to the effect that 
South Jordan would place additional passive warning devices at the crossing, consisting of 
3After the accident the City closed the crossing, which resulted in complaints from 
nearby businesses and residents, complaints from the Sandy City Public Works, police and 
fire departments, and the filing of a lawsuit in Third District Court to force the reopening of 
the road. See Standard Plumbing Supply Company, Inc., et aL, plaintiffs and Sandy City, 
intervening plaintiff, vs. South Jordan City, Third District Court, Civil No. 96-0901387, 
J. Dennis Frederick. As of this date, the new road has been partially constructed, the 1-15 
rebuild is in progress and the upgrade separation at 10600 South is due to be completed 
this year. (Millheim Depo., R. 1424, pp. 75.78). 
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an advance warning sign and some pavement markings. That was done shortly thereafter, 
and, Murphy confirmed same by letter to the Department of Transportation dated July 28, 
1992 (Murphy Depo., R. 1426, pp. 67-69; R. 1412, Exhibit 7, Addendum D). The passive 
warning system which was in place at the crossing as of the time of the accident had been 
recommended to the City by the Utah Department of Transportation, on whose engineering 
expertise the City relied (Murphy Depo., R. 1426, pp. 78-80).4 As is obvious from the 
photographs, these signs were in place and visible to northbound traffic at the time of the 
accident. 
It is tine that both the UDOT and tlie City have, on various occasions, recognized that 
the crossing is "dangerous" and/or that the existing passive protection is "inadequate." 
However, contrary to the plaintiffs' inference, the UDOT never "directed" or "ordered" 
South Jordan City to do anything, and whether the UDOT legally could have is 
problematical; it never tried. In any event, tlie City, tlie UDOT, the Railroad, and the FHWA 
were in agreement by 1992 that the best, long-term, solution would be to close the crossing 
after a new frontage road was built. (R. 1412, Ex. 7, and Depo. Exhs. 6, 10 and 28 attached 
to the Affidavit of Gordon Haight, Addendum C). 
4Tlie Department of Transportation, for some reason, was apparently under the 
erroneous impression that new signs had not been installed and sent a letter to Mr. Murphy 
dated October 20, 1992, confirming that the crossing required advance warning signs and 
pavement markings (R. 1412, Ex. 28). It is clear, however, that all warning signs 
required by the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices were in fact in place as of the 
date of the accident. 
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Appellants have argued that "to do nothing was not an option." However, the City 
did not "do nothing." The City installed proper warning signs consistent with the UDOT's 
recommendation in 1992, and properly maintained them up to the date of the accident. 
Appellants claim that UDOT opined that lights and gates should be installed as early 
as 1979, which is true. There is, however, no evidence that the crossing was ranked high 
enough on tlie UDOT's priority list to obtain federal funding, and concluding that gates and 
lights would be nice is not the same as having funding to install them. 
Appellants claim that tlie crossing could have been upgraded at a nominal cost to the 
City (assuming that roadway realignment was not required). In any event, the documents do 
not establish that funding of improvements at the crossing had been finally approved. The 
May 21, 1990, letter to Mayor Hutchings from the UDOT (R. 1412, Ex. 4, Addendum D) 
is instructive. At the outset, it is not a "directive" or "order" from the UDOT to the City. 
It merely sets out two options, closing tlie crossing and rerouting the road, or installing gates 
and liglits at tlie crossing. If the City were to opt for the latter, the City would be obligated 
for ten percent of the cost, estimated to be $130,000 (exclusive of road realignment). But, 
tlie letter goes on, //tlie City agreed to participate, then the UDOT would proceed to prepare 
a Design Study Report and request approval for preliminary engineering from the Federal 
Highway Administration, and for the Railroad to prepare detailed plans and estimates. Then, 
//approval is received and plans are prepared, the UDOT will prepare formal agreements 
with the Railroad. Then the UDOT will prepare a cooperative agreement with the City. 
Then the Railroad agreement will be submitted to the FHWA requesting authorization to 
proceed with die work. If the FHWA approves, then the Railroad agreement is submitted to 
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the Railroad Company. In other words, final approval of the project was subject to a number 
of contingencies, and it is speculative that this project would have gotten anywhere, as the 
FHWA would likely not approve funds for a crossing which was not even on the priority list. 
Appellants' claim that the UDOT had always insisted that the crossing be upgraded 
is simply not borne out by the documentary evidence. Attached as Addendum D are five key 
documents which illustrate the status of the crossing at the time of the accident. Exhibit 4 
is a letter from the UDOT to Mayor Hutchings, setting forth alternatives and then, assuming 
that the City decided to leave the crossing intact, encouraging the City's commitment to 
participate in an upgrade of the crossing. The letter then sets forth, in the last two 
paragraphs, a number of conditions and contingencies which remained unfulfilled. Exhibit 
5, minutes of a meeting in April 1992, recite that a new master plan had been developed 
which included a grade separation at 10600 South. Exhibit 6, minutes of a meeting or June 
30, 1992, provide in part that it was agreed by the UDOT, South Jordan, and the Federal 
Highway Administration that "South Jordan will place passive warning devices at the 
existing 10200 South crossing and will then move them to the new crossing at 10400 South 
when they close the existing crossing." Exhibit 7 is a letter from the City Administrator 
I S , 
dated July 28, 1992, to the UDOT, stating the City's understanding of the current status of 
the crossing, including that the City has completed the additional signage and warnings, and 
that the crossing will remain open until the new frontage road is completed sometime in the 
next five years. Exhibit 10 is die November 16, 1995, coordinating meeting agenda prepared 
by the UDOT, to the effect that the 10200 South crossing "is on hold" pending completion 
of the oveipass at 10600 South, and the new at-grade crossing. 
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VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Passive warning devices only advise a driver of the fact of a crossing, and alert the 
driver to stop. At that point, by statute, a driver is obligated to stop, look and listen, and 
yield to a train which is close enough to constitute a hazard. In this case, the signs did their 
job, as each vehicle in the caravan stopped, and each of the survivors has acknowledged they 
knew they were at a railroad crossing, and that is why they stopped. 
The district court should be affirmed in all respects, because: 
First, there is no showing that there was anything wrong with the passive warning 
devices in place. The testimony of the witnesses and the unchallenged photographs clearly 
show that the warning signs were upright, bright, and visible, and gave ample notice of the 
fact of a crossing. Thus, to the extent that the City has a duty to warn of a potentially 
dangerous condition, that duty was fulfilled. 
Second, the district court was correct in rejecting the claim that the City was obligated 
to install some other or additional warning or traffic control devices, because: 
a. A municipality has no legal duty to install any particular type of sign 
or warning device, even at a "dangerous" location. If signing is installed, it need only 
provide adequate, not perfect, signing. Once the municipality installs devices, its obligation 
is limited to maintaining them in a reasonably safe and visible condition. The City need only 
ensure that "some visible warning signage is present on the public road," and that duty was 
discharged. 
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b. The discretionary function exception to liability (§ 63-30-10(1) of the 
Governmental Immunity Act) retains immunity for the City with regard to decisions as to 
whether to upgrade the protection at the crossing. 
Third, summary judgment was proper because plaintiffs have not met their burden of 
showing a causal connection between the negligent conduct complained of and the injury to 
the plaintiffs. In other words, there is no evidence that any problem with the passive warning 
devices in any way interfered with Mr. Larrabee's ability to stop at the crossing, and yield 
to a train close enough to constitute a hazard.5 
The district court was correct in striking the Affidavit of Archie Burnham, which 
consists of little more than a bare assertion that Mr. Bumham has reviewed the facts, and is 
of the opinion that tlie crossing was dangerous. The affidavit is deficient under Rule 56(e), 
U.R.C.P., because it lacks the specific facts that logically support the conclusions therein. 
In any event, tlie affidavit is irrelevant to the issue of the City's duty, either at common law 
or under the Governmental Immunity Act, since tlie City has no duty to install any particular 
type of warning devices at any intersection, regardless of how "dangerous" it is. 
Appellants' complaints about the signs and pavement markings are, essentially, that 
they were not visible at all, or not soon enough. This complaint might make sense if the 
^The District Court granted summary judgment to the City because it owed no duty 
to install additional warning devices and in any event, the devices in place worked and thus 
any duty was fulfilled. This Court may affirm on that basis, or on any other ground raised 
below, including governmental immunity and lack of evidence of causation. See DeBry 
v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995). 
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decedent had simply driven onto the crossing without stopping. However, the signs and 
markings must have been visible, since every car in the caravan came to a complete stop. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Correctly Held That the City Breached No Duty. 
The City is not the insurer of the safety of everyone who travels on its roads. The 
City's duty is to maintain its roads in a reasonable safe condition and to exercise reasonable 
care to warn travelers of potentially unsafe locations, such as railroad crossings. See, e.g., 
Fishbaiigh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403 (UT 1998). There is no duty to erect any 
paiticular traffic control device; the law requires only that once the municipality takes action 
to install such devices, it must do so in a non-negligent manner and maintain traffic control 
devices in a reasonably safe and visible condition. Jones v. Bountiful City, 834 P.2d 556 
(UtahCt. App. 1992). 
In the instant case, it is undisputed that advance warning signs were in place advising 
of the curve, the railroad crossing, and the stop sign. At the crossing itself were a stop sign 
and crossbucks which were clearly visible. Eveiyone in the Caravan knew they were 
approaching a crossing and stopped. 
The signs did their job: each of the surviving drivers and passengers testified that they 
knew that they were at a railroad crossing. At that point, responsibility shifts to the driver 
to comply with § 41-6-95, Utah Code: 
(1) Whenever any person driving a vehicle approaches a railroad grade 
crossing, the driver of the vehicle shall stop within 50 feet, but not less than 
15 feet from the nearest rail of the railroad track and may not proceed if: 
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* * * 
(c) A railroad train approaching within approximately 1,500 
feet of the highway crossing emits a signal audible from such 
distance and the train by reason of its speed or nearness to the 
crossing is an immediate hazard; 
(d) An approaching train is plainly visible and is in 
hazardous proximity to the crossing; or 
(e) There is any other condition that makes it unsafe to 
proceed through the crossing. 
In Jones, supra, the Court held that the City had no duty to install any particular 
traffic control device at an intersection. The Court concluded that a city is not generally 
liable for failure to install signs or signals and has no duty to exercise its discretion. Rather, 
the common law requires only that once the municipality installs a sign, it must do so in a 
nonnegligent manner and maintain same in a reasonably safe, visible and working condition. 
834 P.2d at 560. There is no dispute in the instant case but that the signs in place for the 
plaintiffs' decedents were reasonably safe, visible and in working condition. See also, 
deVilliersv. Utah County, etal, 882P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1994), cert den. 890 P.2d 1034, 
holding that Utah County had no duty to erect warning signs, even at a "dangerous" 
intersection.6 
6Only if the City put up a particular warning device and then failed to maintain it, 
for example, failing to replace it if knocked down, might the City be liable. Compare 
Jones v. Bountiful City, 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992) (no duty to erect any particular 
traffic control device) and the Court of Appeals decision in Duncan v. Union Pacific (no 
liability "if some visible warning signage is present on the public road") with Bowen v. 
Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982) (stop sign knocked down) and Nelson v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996) (failing to repair hole in fence between 
playground and river). 
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B. The City's Decisions Regarding the Crossing Are Immune as Discretionary, 
Railroad crossing suits have been brought against the railroads for years. See, e.g. 
English v. Southern Pacific Co., 45 P.47 (Utah 1896). The first reported case where a claim 
was brought against a governmental entity for alleging failing to put up more and/or better 
warning devices was Velasquez v. Union Pacific and the Utah Public Service Commission, 
469 P.2d 5 (UT 1970), where the plaintiff claimed that the Public Service Commission 
(which at that time had responsibility for railroad crossings) should be liable because the 
railroad crossing did not have warning devices to the plaintiffs liking. The Utah Supreme 
Court made short work of his claim, pointing out that by statute (§ 54-4-14), the Public 
Service Commission had the power to require certain appropriate safety devices at crossing, 
but that obviously the claim arose out of the exercise or failure to exercise a discretionary 
function or to conduct an inspection, both of which were (and are) immunized by § 63-30-
10(1)(4), Utah Code.7 The Court noted: 
The statute gives the respondent the power to require a different safety device 
at the crossing in question, but that does not mean that the plaintiff should 
recover simply because a better warning signal could or should have been 
installed. 
In Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande and Utah Department of Transportation, 749 P.2d 
660 (Utah App. 1988), this court affirmed summary judgment for the UDOT where it was 
alleged that UDOT breached its duty under §§ 54-4-14 through 15.1, Utah Code, to "install, 
7The Utah Governmental Immunity Act at die time of the instant accident provided 
in Section 10 that "immunity from s u i t . . . is waived . . . except if the injury arises out 
of, in connection with, or results from: (1) the exercise or performance or the failure to 
exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused . . . 
(4) A failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent inspection. 
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maintain and improve safety signals and devices" even though there was in place a yellow 
advance warning sign, a crossbuck, and a stop sign at the crossing. The plaintiff claimed that 
UDOT should have known of the dangerous condition of the crossing and that it negligently 
failed to install some more elaborate safety signals or devices. The Court of Appeals took 
note of Velasquez, supra, and went on to apply the discretionary function test earlier set forth 
in Little v. Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983) which are: 
(1) Does the challenged act, omission or decision necessarily involve a 
basic governmental policy, program or objective? 
(2) Is the questioned act, omission or decision essential to the realization 
or accomplishment of that policy program or objective? 
(3) Does the act, omission or decision require the exercise of basic policy 
evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of the governmental entity 
involved? 
(4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite 
constitutional statutory or other lawful authority and duty to make the act, 
omission or decision complained of? 
The Court held that the discretionary function exception clearly applied to the UDOT and 
affirmed summary judgment in its favor. The analysis by the Court of Appeals, as it relates 
to the Utah Department of Transportation, is equally applicable to the City of South Jordan. 
Like the UDOT, the basic governmental objectives involved is the regulation of traffic and 
public safety. Evaluating the railroad crossing was, of course, essential to the realization of 
that goal and prioritization was necessary because of limited public funds. The City, through 
its own engineering staff, and reliance on the expertise of the UDOT, exercised basic policy 
evaluation, judgment and expertise. Like the UDOT, the City has legal authority to supervise 
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and regulate the safety of its roads. See, for example, §§ 10-8-8, 30, 32, and 33, Utah Code8, 
which provide generally that cities may establish streets and roads and regulate traffic 
thereon. 
In 1990, this Court decided Duncan v. Union Pacific and the Utah Department of 
Transportation, 790 P.2d 595 (Utah App. 1990). Duncan arose from an accident occurring 
on a state road which crossed the Union Pacific tracks. The UDOT had periodically 
evaluated the crossing, but it was never found necessaiy to install additional safety 
improvements, such as gates and lights. The Court applied Gleave, concluded that UDOT's 
decisions were discretionary, and affirmed summary judgment. The Court rejected the 
notion that the UDOT should be liable for "its failure to better warn and control traffic at the 
crossing," and noted: 
Highway maintenance and improvement are predominately fiscal matters. 
Eveiy highway could probably be made safer by further expenditures, but we 
will not hold UDOT (and implicitly, the Legislature) negligent for having to 
strike a difficult balance between the need for greater safety and the burden for 
funding improvements. 
* * * 
. . . The net effect of this holding is that if the railroad's right-of-way does not 
negligently obscure an oncoming train, the train is properly operated, and if 
some visible warning signage is present on the public road, then the plaintiff 
is not entitled to relief in tort for an injury at the crossing . . . . (emphasis 
added) 
8Section 10-8-30 provides, in relevant part, that cities "may regulate the movement 
of traffic on the streets . . . including the movement of pedestrians as well as of vehicles, 
and the cars and engines of railroads . . . . In Section 10-8-11 provides that cities "may 
regulate the use of streets, alleys, avenues. . . ." Section 10-8-33 provides that cities may 
"permit, regulate, or prohibit the locating, constructing or laying of the tracks of any 
railroad, or tramway in any street, alley or public place . . . ." 
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Visible warning signage which was effective to alert Mr. Larrabee was in place at the 
time of this accident, and Duncan v. Union Pacific, by itself, mandates summary judgment 
in favor of South Jordan. 
The Court of Appeals decision in Duncan was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Duncan v. Union Pacific, 842 P.2d 832 (UT 1992): 
We reaffirm our holding in Velasquez that the duties imposed upon UDOT in 
these particulars are truly discretionary functions and are, therefore, protected 
by governmental immunity. 
842 P.2d at 835. 
Other decisions by the Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court make it clear 
that decisions by governmental entities, including cities, as to what types of signs should be 
installed at a particular location on a public road are discretionary. 
In Keegan v. Utah Department of Transportation, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995), the 
Supreme Court again visited the issue of what is a discretionary function. The Court held 
that the UDOT's decision not to raise a concrete median banier on 1-80 was discretionary 
and the UDOT was immune from suit. The Court reaffirmed the teachings of Duncan v. 
Union Pacific and Velasquez, and quoting from the Court of Appeals opinion in Duncan, the 
Court restated: 
Highway maintenance and improvement are predominately fiscal matters. 
Every highway could probably be made safer by further expenditures, but we 
will not hold UDOT (and implicitly, the legislature) negligent for having to 
strike a difficult balance between the need for greater safety and the burden of 
funding improvements. In accordance with this principal, we conclude that the 
decision made in this case is analogous to the decisions addressed in 
Velasquez, Duncan, and Rocky Ml Thrift The plaintiffs' claims in Velasquez 
and Duncan concern decisions not to upgrade allegedly defectively marked 
railroad crossing warning devices; Rocky Mt. Thrift involved questions 
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surrounding the design of a city flood control system. Like the case at bar, all 
three cases addressed basic policy-based decisions. As stated by this Court in 
Duncan, since the said decisions were "the result of serious and extensive 
policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise in numerous areas of concern . . . 
the duties imposed upon UDOT in relation to those decisions "are truly 
discretionary functions and are therefore protected by governmental immunity 
[under § 63-30-10], at 624-625. 
South Jordan City properly exercised its discretion in deciding to eventually close the 
crossing after the new road was built, and not to squander its resources by installing gates 
and lights, and rebuilding the approaches to the crossing, only to abandon same a few years 
later. The City submits that all of the legal, political, public policy evaluation, and practical 
reasons for immunizing the UDOT for railroad crossing claims, apply equally to the City of 
South Jordan 
The latest case dealing with discretionary function is Trujillo v. UDOT, 986 P.2d 752 
(1999 Utah Ct. App.). Trujillo held that the UDOT was not entitled to immunity where it 
had allowed the placement of plastic barrels every 100 feet to separate two-way traffic on 
1-84, failed to reduce the speed limit as required by the Traffic Control Plan, the errors and 
omissions were made at the operational level, and the Traffic Control Plan was formulated 
by an unlicensed, low-level UDOT employee. Trujillo, however, recognizes those 
circumstances where discretionary function immunity is appropriate, for example: the 
exception "shields those governmental acts and decisions impacting on large numbers of 
people in a myriad of unforeseen ways from individual and class legal actions, the continual 
threat of which would make public administration all but impossible," at 758, \ 20. 
Discretionaiy function is not susceptible to precise definition in all legal contexts, but 
discretionary acts are those "characterized by a high degree of discretion and judgment 
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involved in weigliing alternatives and making choices with respect to public policy and 
planning...," and that are "the result of serious and extensive policy evaluation, judgment, 
and expertise in numerous areas of concern" % 22. Citing Keegan, the court noted that 
decisions would be immunized which are "inherently bound up in economic, political, and 
safety considerations . . . ," at 759, \ 24. 
In the instant case, the City's decisions regarding the crossing involved a number of 
considerations: spending the City's money to upgrade the crossing, only to close same a few 
years later, might, indeed, impact on a large number of people, and subject the City to threats 
of individual and class legal actions. Further, as is clear from the testimony and documents 
herein, the City's decision relative to the crossing involved a high degree of discretion and 
judgment, weigliing alternatives, making choices with respect to public policy and planning, 
was the result of extensive policy evaluation, judgment and expertise with regard to traffic 
movement, urban planning and development, and financial concerns. The City's decisions 
were inherently bound up in economic, political, and safety considerations. Discretionary 
function immunity would not be available to the City under Trnjillo, only if the decisions 
regarding the crossing had been made by a low-level employee and/or consisted or 
negligently implementing the decision, for example, failing to install or maintain the passive 
warning signs. In the instant case, it is clear that the signs were properly installed and 
maintained, and the decisions in effect at the time of the accident were made by the highest 
levels of City officials, including the Mayor and City Manager, and various engineers from 
the Department of Transportation, the railroad, and the Federal Highway Administration. 
35 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1. Appellants5 Arguments Below 
In their brief, appellants argue, as to the City, only the issue of duty. The City will 
deal briefly with some of appellants' arguments regarding immunity that they made in the 
court below, in the event similar arguments are raised in their reply brief. 
Appellants argued that decisions regarding warning devices at railroad crossings are 
not "governmental," because, since the Railroad could have done something about the 
crossing, the City's acts are nongovernmental and thus not immunized. However, controlling 
case law has always held that decisions relating to signing, and particularly signing at 
railroad crossings, is "governmental." See, e.g. Velasquez v. Union Pacific, Gleave v. 
Denver & Rio Grande, and Duncan v. Union Pacific, supra. See also, McCorvey v. Utah 
DOT, 808 P.2d 431 (UT 1993); Ledfors v. Emery County, 849 P.2d 1162 (UT 1993). 
Appellants also argued that the discretionary function immunity granted by § 63-30-
10 was subordinated to § 63-30-8, which waives immunity for injuries caused by defective 
or dangerous conditions of streets. However, the proper analysis was stated in Ledfors, 
supra: 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act requires that we address three 
questions in determining whether a governmental entity is immune from suit. 
First, was the activity the entity performed a governmental function and 
therefore immunized from suit by the general grant of immunity contained in 
§ 63-30-3? . . . Second, if the activity was a governmental function, has 
some other section of the Act waived that blanket immunity? Third, if the 
blanket immunity has been waived, does the Act also contain an exception to 
that waiver which results in a retention of an immunity against the particular 
claim asserted in this case? (at 1164.) 
36 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This analysis was applied in a road case in Keegan v. State of Utah, supra. The 
Supreme Court concluded that activities relating to the construction and maintenance of a 
roadway could only be performed by a governmental agency and thus such activities are 
"governmental." The Court then determined that, while § 63-30-8 waives immunity for 
injuries caused by a defective road, nevertheless, the discretionary function exception in 
Section 10 trumps the waiver of Section 8 and that this principle has been well recognized 
by Utah case law since Velasquez v. Union Pacific. 
Plaintiffs also argued that the City's decision not to install lights and gates at the 
crossing was not the exercise of a discretionary function. Plaintiffs conceded that the City's 
decision meet the first two tests of the Little v. Division of Family Sennces, 667 P.2d 49 
(Utah 1983), four-part test for determining discretionaiy function, but argued that the City's 
activities did not meet the third and fourth tests. Their argument was apparently that, since 
UDOT had determined that lights and gates were "required" at the crossing, that that was the 
end of the inquiry and the City could not therefore exercise any basic policy evaluation, 
judgment and expertise.9 Keegan v. UDOT, however, is to the contrary. There, the third 
test was satisfied where the UDOT had studied and debated the proposed action and its costs 
and benefits, just as the City did here, albeit with the concurrence and cooperation of the 
UDOT, the Railroad and the Federal Agency concerned. 
^ l e basic premise of this argument is flawed. While the UDOT at one time may 
have tliought that lights and gates were appropriate, it is undisputed that as of the time of 
the subject accident, all parties concerned had agreed that a new frontage road would be 
constructed and the crossing eventually closed, and in the meantime that it would be 
protected with passive warning devices. See Addendum D. 
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Plaintiffs also argued below that the City did not "possess the requisite constitutional, 
statutory or lawful authority to make the challenged act, omission or decision" (the fourth 
test under Little). The argument is unclear, but is apparently that since UDOT has authority 
over what types of crossing devices are to be installed, that the City then has nothing to say 
about it. They also asserted that "once UDOT determines that a crossing requires active 
warning devices, it issues a directive for the installation to the municipality with jurisdiction 
over the crossing." However, there is no support for this proposition anywhere in the 
evidence or in the statutory or case law and, again, Keegan is to the contrary; it held that 
since the UDOT has authority over state highways the fourth test is met. Similarly, since the 
City has authority over its streets under Chapter 10-8, Utah Code, the result should be the 
same as in Keegan. 
Sections 54-4-15, 15.1, 15.2 and 15.3, Utah Code, set forth the authority of the 
Department of Transportation. The statute, unfortunately, is not a model of clarity. It 
purports to give the DOT the power to direct modifications at railroad crossings, and to 
determine how the cost is to be apportioned between the local authority and the railroad, with 
the Public Service Commission to mediate disputes. It is clear, however, in § 15.1 that the 
Depaitment shall "provide for the installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and improving of 
automatic and other safety appliances, signals, or devices at grade crossings on public 
highways or roads. . . ." Thus, it is clear that the UDOT is responsible for what types of 
crossing protection is to be installed. On the other hand, the City has the power under 
Chapter 10-8, Utah Code, to regulate movement of traffic on its streets, may regulate the 
constructing and locating of railroad tracks, etc. Thus, it is unclear whether the UDOT has 
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the authority to direct or order the City to do anything. Fortunately, this Court need not 
resolve tliese questions, because even assuming that the UDOT had the authority to order a 
municipality how to spend its tax dollars, the simple fact is that the UDOT never ordered or 
directed the City of South Jordan to do anything, never made any final determinations as to 
who was to pay how much to upgrade the crossing, and, four years before the accident, 
agreed that the crossing did not need to be upgraded, but protected only with additional 
passive warning devices. Thus, appellants' arguments fail, both factually and legally. 
C. Summary Judgment Was Appropriate Because Plaintiffs Failed to Establish 
Causation, 
Appellants' basic theory is that active warning devices are better than passive warning 
devices, which is true, but as seen above, the City has no duty to install such devices. 
In addition, appellants have also alleged some vague deficiencies in the passive 
signing system. However, even assuming, contrary to the evidence, that there was some 
deficiency, the plaintiffs are still not entitled to recover. This is because every one of the 
drivers in the caravan knew there was a railroad crossing and they all stopped for the stop 
sign and crossbuck at the crossing. The passive warning signs performed their intended 
function and tliere is no evidence that there was anything to keep Mr. Larrabee from seeing 
the train. There is simply no causal link between any alleged defect in the signs and the 
accident. 
A prima facie case of negligence requires that the plaintiff show (1) a duty of 
reasonable care extending to the plaintiffs; (2) breach of that duty by the defendant; 
(3) proximate and actual causation; and (4) damages suffered by plaintiffs, see Clark v. 
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Farmers Insurance Exchange, 893 P.2d 598 (Utah App. 1995). In the context of a motion 
for summary judgment, the moving party has the burden to show that it is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. However, in opposing a motion for summary judgment, the 
plaintiffs still have the ultimate burden of proving all of the elements of their cause of action. 
Further, once challenged, the party opposing such a motion must come forward with 
sufficient proof to support its claim. Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 
1997). Assuming, arguendo, that there was some deficiency regarding the signs, plaintiffs 
are unable to meet their burden of showing causation. 
In Weber v. Springville, 725 P.2d 1360, 1367 (Utah 1986), a child fell in at some 
unknown point along the shore of an unguarded stream. The Supreme Court affirmed 
summary judgment in favor of the City because the plaintiffs could not establish where the 
youngster fell into the creek. The Court held that the plaintiffs inability to establish factual 
cause is fatal to their claim, and noted that "a mere possibility of such causation is not 
enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the 
probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the Court to direct a verdict 
for defendant," 725 P.2d at 1367. The mle is well established in this jurisdiction that "when 
the proximate cause of an injury is left to speculation, the claim fails as a matter of law." 
Devinev. Cook, 279 P.2d 1073, 1083 (Utah 1955); Clark v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 
Inc., supra; Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 930 P.2d 904 (Utah App. 1997). 
In Clark, the plaintiff was injured in a complicated multi-car accident. No one could 
say for sure which of the defendants, if any of them, actually struck the plaintiff. The Court 
affirmed summary judgment, noting that the trial court may rule as a matter of law on the 
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issue of proximate cause when there is no evidence to establish a causal connection, thus 
leaving causation to speculation. 
In Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985), a hotel guest was 
murdered and claim was brought against the hotel for alleged inadequate security. The 
Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment, because there was no direct evidence linking 
the decedent's death with inadequate security, and any attempt to relate the death to the 
alleged negligence of the hotel was completely speculative. 
In the instant case, no one knows or will ever know why Brent Larrabee pulled out 
in front of the Amtrak train. He may or may not have seen the train, or misjudged its speed 
or distance, or decided blindly to follow the car in front of him. There is, however, 
absolutely no evidence that he did not know that he was at a railroad crossing. The claim 
that the signs were the cause of LaiTabee's alleged failure to see the train must be based on 
pure speculation, and plaintiffs' claims must be dismissed for failure to establish causation, 
actual or proximate. 
D. The District Court Properly Struck the Affidavit of Archie Burnham. 
Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P., provides that affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would 
be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify 
to the matters stated therein." Once that foundation is laid, the affidavits also "must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," that is, the statements made by 
the affiant must be relevant to the Motion for Summary Judgment. Affidavits that do not 
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meet the requirements of Rule 56(e) are subject to being stricken, Howick v. Bank of Salt 
Lake, 498 P.2d 352 (1972), and a motion to strike is appropriate in order for the court to test 
whether the affidavits meet the requirements of Rule 56(e). 
In addition, the Utah Rules of Evidence also require that statements of fact, to be 
admissible, must be relevant, U.R.E. 402, and based on personal knowledge, U.R.E. 602. 
The admissibility of opinion testimony is also expressly limited. If an opinion is 
offered by an expert witness, that witness must be qualified to render the opinion "by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education," U.R.E. 702. In either event, the 
opinion must also be helpful to the court. 
Affidavits containing expert opinions must also set forth foundational facts, that is, 
specific facts that logically support the opinion. Batterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 
1992). 
Finally, opinion testimony that offers a legal conclusion may not be considered. In 
Dcnndson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225 (Ut. App. 1991), the court held that an expert could not 
render a conclusory opinion that a party's conduct was negligent. Clearly, it is only the 
court, and not an expert witness, which is to decide issues of law, Ashton v. Ashtcn, 733 P.2d 
147 (Utah 1987). 
Applying the above principles to the affidavit of Archie Burnham (R. 889-892), it is 
clear that his affidavit is deficient and inadmissible.10 
10The Affidavit advances two basic notions: first, that the signs were not visible and 
presumably failed to advise of the fact of the crossing, and second, that regardless of the 
visibility, die crossing was nevertheless dangerous. The first is factually false. The 
second is irrelevant to the City's duty, deVilliers v. Utah County, supra. 
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The various paragraphs thereof are deficient because: (a) there is no specific citation 
to any traffic engineering standards or authorities; (b) there is no statement that the affiant 
is even qualified to venture opinions, and his CV was not attached to the Affidavit; (c) many 
of the terms are vague and undefined, including "background clutter," "excessive hazard," 
"angularity," "crossing geometry," "motorist distractions," "driver defects," "visibility 
conditions," "deceptive and difficult," "fully reflectorized," "too close to stop," etc.; (d) 
many of the assertions are irrelevant and argumentative, and speculative, for example, that 
Brent Larrabee could not see the train; (e) some "facts" are based on double hearsay or 
worse, for example, paragraph 13. 
Paragraph 14 should be stricken, because tlie opinion that the crossing was "ultra-
hazardous" is a legal conclusion. Under Utah law a railroad cannot be liable for a crossing 
accident unless tlie crossing is "more than ordinarily hazardous"; in making that 
determination, die law requires an analysis of the facts in light of the legal duties owed by 
tlie railroad to determine if there is liability, just as is done in analyzing whether a party 
is negligent, see Duncan v. Union Pacific, 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992). Thus, in venturing 
tlie opinion that the crossing was "ultra-hazardous," Mr. Burnham necessarily had to make 
a legal conclusion of what duties the defendant railroad owed with respect to the crossing 
and, even more improperly, extrapolating from case law involving railroad liability, and 
attempting to apply same to municipal liability. 
Paragraph 14D purports to state that the City had some legal duty to provide "traffic 
control." Indeed, traffic control was in place, i.e., advance warning signs, pavement 
43 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
markings, a stop sign and crossbucks, and the City discharged any such duty. To the 
extent paragraph 14D states that the City has a legal duty to install automatic flashing lights 
and gates, same should be stricken as an inadmissible legal conclusion. 
In summary, the Affidavit of Archie Burnham lacks specific factual foundation, and 
is deficient under Rule 56(e) and Rules 701 through 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
While Mr. Burnham says that he has reviewed the accident report, some photographs, the 
accident history, statements of witnesses, and conducted an on-site evaluation, such a 
conclusory statement, without more, is insufficient.11 It is similar to the affidavit of the 
expert in American Concept Insurance Company v. Lockheed, 751 P.2d 271 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1988), which said only that the expert had reviewed the insurance company's file, and in 
his opinion the insurance company had breached its duties of good faith and fair dealing 
to its insured, but as the Utah Supreme Court noted four years later, in Buttetfield v. 
Okubo: "[A] bare assertion that the expert has reviewed the facts and based his or her 
opinion on them will not suffice. At 104. 
In other words, to simply say that an affiant has looked at a "file" or a "report" or 
"photographs," without setting forth the specific facts gleaned therefrom which are 
relevant to an opinion, is not sufficient. 
nIn addition, if the documentation reviewed consists of "reports, surveys . . . or 
data compiled . . . for die purpose of identifying, evaluating, or planning the safety 
enhancement of . . . railway-highway crossings [same] . . . shall not be subject to 
discovery or admitted into evidence in a Federal or State court proceeding . . . ." 23 
U.S.C.A. § 409. Nor does an affidavit based thereon need to be considered. See Duncan 
v. Union Pacific, 790 P.2d 595 (Utah App. 1990), 597-598, n. 2. 
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Plaintiffs rely on Gaw v. State DOT, 809 P.2d 1130 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), wherein 
the Court concluded that the plaintiffs affidavits met the test in American Concept 
Insurance Company, and that the affidavits were sufficient to raise an issue of material 
fact. Two years later, however, the Utah Supreme Court decided Butterfield v. Okubo, 
and effectively overruled Gaw. After a lengthy discussion regarding the conflict between 
Rule 705 and Rule 56(e), the court explicitly held that 
. . . affidavits must include not only the expert's opinion, but also the 
specific facts that logically support die expert's conclusion. See Williams v. 
Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985). In so doing, we stress the requirement 
that Rule 56(e) requires specific facts. Contrary to the Utah Court of 
Appeals statement in American Concept Insurance Company v. Lockhead, 
751 P.2d 271, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), a bare assertion that the expert has 
reviewed the facts and based his or her opinion on them will not suffice. 
. . . Utah has long required nonexpert Rule 56 affiants to enumerate the 
specific evidentiary facts in support of their conclusions. [Citations omitted.] 
In recent years we have made clear that this standard also applies to a situation 
in which the affiant testifies as an expert [citations omitted]. 
* * * 
Utah is not alone in requiring experts' affidavits to include supporting factual 
bases for their opinions. Numerous federal courts have found that factually 
unsupported conclusions and affidavits are insufficient to withstand summary 
judgment. [Citations omitted.] As the District of Columbia Circuit has 
observed: 
To hold that [the Rules of Evidence] prevent a court from 
granting summary judgment against a party who relies solely on 
an expert's opinion that has no more basis in or out of the record 
than [the plaintiffs' experts] theoretical speculations would 
seriously undermine the policies of Rule 56 . . . the position that 
an expert's opinion that lacks any credible support creates an 
issue of "fact" is clearly untenable. Merit Motors, Inc., v. 
Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 566, 673, and n. 27 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(emphasis in original). 
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831 P.2d at 102-103. See also, Harper v. Summit County, 963 P.2d 768 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998); Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 930 P.2d 904 (Utah Ct. App. 1997, n. 4). 
The Burnham Affidavit is exacdy the kind of affidavit which was of concern to die 
Utah Supreme Court in Butterfteld, and to die many courts cited in that opinion. It is the 
sort of dieoretical speculation, unsupported by any specific factual basis, which should not 
be considered in opposition to a valid motion for summary judgment. To allow this type 
of affidavit to defeat a motion for summary judgment would greatly weaken Rule 56, and 
its goal of weeding out meridess cases before trial. As noted by the court in Merit Motors 
at 673: 
We are unwilling to impose die fruitless expenses of litigation diat would 
result from such a limitation on the power of a court to grant summary 
judgment." 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The loss of die appellants' children in this accident was indeed a tragedy. However, 
the City simply is not liable. The signs which were in place were sufficient to warn any 
reasonable person of the existence of the crossing, and Mr. Larrabee should have stopped 
and not proceeded until the train had cleared the crossing. The City has no legal duty to 
install "active" devices, and its decisions regarding signing at the crossing are immune from 
second-guessing by virtue of controlling case law and the Governmental Immunity Act. For 
all of the reasons set forth above, the District Court should be affirmed in all respects. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £7_ day of March, 2000. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By GUUPU 
farix. Larson 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
City of South Jordan 
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ALLAN L. LARSON (A 1896) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant City of South Jordan 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL D. PRICE, SUSANNE Q. 
PRICE, KENT SWENSEN, KAY 
SWENSEN, ROSS LARRABEE and AFFIDAVIT OF GORDON HAIGHT 
CARMA LARRABEE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Civil No. 970903387WD 
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER 
CORPORATION, SOUTHERN PACIFIC Judge Anne M. Stirba 
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, and 
CITY OF SOUTH JORDAN, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
GORDON HAIGHT, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of 21 years and am a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah. From 
approximately April 30, 1994, until the beginning of January 1996 I served as the City Engineer 
for the City of South Jordan. 
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2. I graduated from Brigham Young University in 1987 with a bachelor's degree in 
civil engineering, and a master's degree in engineering management. Upon graduation I worked 
for five years for Centennial Engineering as a professional civil engineer, until 1992 when 
I worked for approximately one year for the City of West Jordan as the Staff Engineer. I was the 
City Engineer for the City of Draper from 1992 until I went to work for the City of South Jordan 
in the spring of 1994. 
3. I am a licensed Professional Engineer of the State of Utah, License No. 
92-176319-2202. 
4. I have experience and training in traffic engineering, and am familiar with 300 
West Street and the railroad crossing at 300 West and 10200 South in South Jordan, Utah. I am 
familiar with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices ("the Manual") published by the 
Federal Highway Administration and the United States Department of Transportation, which has 
been adopted for use both by the Federal Highway Administration and the State of Utah. 
5. I visited the scene of the accident which is the subject of this lawsuit within a few 
days thereafter, and drove north on 300 West. The signs along 300 West for northbound traffic 
were in place and visible, and were the same signs that had been there for northbound traffic since 
I first became the South Jordan City Engineer. Attached are color copies of ten photographs 
which I understand were taken the day after the accident by a Mr. Callahan of the Federal 
Highway Administration, and later turned over to Officer Carruth. I recognize the scene, and the 
photographs accurately depict the situation as it would have existed on the night of the accident. 
-2-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Photograph 1 is looking northbound, and shows the reverse turn sign. Photograph 2 is looking 
northbound, and shows the railroad advance warning sign and the pavement markings, with the 
stop sign advance warning sign in the background. Photograph 3 is a similar view, further back. 
Photograph 4 shows the advance stop sign warning sign. Photograph 5 is taken just before the 
road turns to the right to cross the tracks. Photograph 6 is the same. Photograph 7 shows the stop 
sign and crossbuck in place for northbound traffic. Photograph 8 shows a side view of the 
crossbuck and stop sign, and the stop bar painted on the pavement roughly even with the stop 
sign. Photographs 9 and 10 are views up and down the track from the middle of the crossing. 
I have also recently reviewed the deposition of Officer Jack Carruth, who was the South Jordan 
police officer who investigated the accident. Officer Carruth testified, and I concur, that the 
following signs were in place and visible to northbound traffic on 300 West approaching the 
crossing at 10200 South. 
6. The first sign, which is depicted in Exhibit 3 to Officer Carruth's deposition, is a 
speed limit sign indicating that the speed limit was 40 miles per hour. 
7. The second sign, Exhibit 4 to Officer Carruth's deposition, was a "reverse turn 
sign." Attached hereto is a copy of paragraph 2C-6 of the Manual, referring to the reverse turn 
sign. In my opinion, the reverse turn sign on 300 West was appropriate and used in accordance 
with the Manual. 
8. The next sign for northbound traffic on 300 West was the railroad advance warning 
sign shown in Exhibit 5 to Officer Carruth's deposition. Also shown in that exhibit on the road 
-3-
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surface just past the sign is the railroad advance warning pavement marking. Attached hereto are 
copies of paragraphs 8B-3, 8B-4, and figure 8-2, describing the use of the railroad advance 
warning sign and the pavement markings. The pavement markings on the road were consistent 
with those recommended in figure 8-2. In my opinion, the railroad advance warning sign and the 
railroad advance warning pavement markings were appropriate and used in accordance with the 
Manual. 
9. The next sign, which can be seen in the background in Exhibit 5 to Officer 
Carruth's deposition, is a "stop ahead sign." Attached hereto is a copy of paragraph 2C-15 of the 
Manual, which describes the use of the stop ahead sign. In my opinion, the stop ahead sign was 
appropriate and used in accordance with the Manual. 
10. The next signs are located immediately before the road crosses the single railroad 
track, and consists of a stop sign and railroad crossing (crossbuck) sign, and are depicted in 
Exhibit 6 of Officer Carruth's deposition. Attached is a copy of paragraph 8B-1 of the Manual, 
setting forth the purpose of passive traffic control systems, paragraph 8B-2, dealing with railroad 
crossing (crossbuck) signs, and figure 8-1 of the Manual, depicting a railroad crossbuck sign. In 
my opinion, the railroad crossing crossbuck sign is properly used and its use at this location is 
consistent with and, in fact, mandated by the Manual. 
11. Attached hereto are copies of paragraphs 2B-4, 2B-5, and 8B-9, dealing with stop 
signs in general, and the use of stop signs at railroad grade crossings. Section 8B-9 of the Manual 
requires an engineering study for use of stop signs at grade crossings and, while I am not aware 
-4-
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of a specific written engineering study, documents produced in this case make it clear that the 
crossing had been the subject of ongoing engineering scrutiny from the Utah Department of 
Transportation, the Federal Highway Administration, South Jordan City, and the railroad. See, 
for example, the letter from James Nelson of the UDOT to Mayor Theron Hutchings dated 
May 21, 1990 (deposition Exhibit 4), memorandum of a surveillance review on June 30, 1992 
(deposition Exhibit 6), letter from Mac Christensen to Tony Murphy, South Jordan City Manager, 
dated October 20, 1992, reminding that signing and pavement markings are the responsibility of 
the City (deposition Exhibit 28), and copy of letter dated October 18, 1995, from James Nelson 
of the UDOT to the Southern Pacific Railroad regarding November 16, 1995, coordinating 
meeting, with attached agenda, Item 2B of which apparently reflects the status of the crossing as 
of the date of the subject accident. In any event, it is my opinion that a stop sign at the railroad 
crossing was appropriate under paragraph 8B-9 of the Manual, since 300 West is a secondary road 
with low traffic, train traffic is substantial, something in the range of 30 trains per day, traffic was 
required to reduce speed because of the road turning to cross the track, and at the stop bar there 
would be sufficient sight distance, as required by subparagraph 4. In my opinion, the use of the 
stop sign at the location of this crossing is appropriate and consistent with the Manual. 
12. In my opinion, the array of signs available to northbound drivers on the night of 
the accident was adequate to identify and direct a driver's attention to the existence and location 
of a railroad grade crossing, which is all that a passive traffic control system can accomplish. The 
traffic control system in place was consistent with the Manual and complied with traffic 
engineering standards generally. A driver being confronted with a railroad crossing crossbuck 
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sign and a stop sign at a railroad crossing should stop, look and listen for trains, and not proceed 
if a train is approaching. 
DATED this f% day of November, 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this \3 day of November, 1998 
' ~;™; NOTARY PUBLIC 
/£ ; : ; ~r% '-AUR1E G. BECK 
. * sf^£]gc\\ 2511 South West Temple 
\i>[ & A i k U oalt Lake City, Utah 84115 
VA ^ 5 ^ - v / y My Commission Expires 
i V K i . ^ y June 19,2001 
X ^ V STATE OF UTAH 
CLL^A <;AA o^U 
My Commission Expires: 
0" l°i-Ol 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
N:\13607\322\MC\PLDG.AFF 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF 
GORDON HAIGHT (Case No. 970903387WD, Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah) to be sent, by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
David J. Jordan, Esq. 
Stoel Rives, L.L.P. 
201 South Main Street #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-4904 
Robert A. Schuetze, Esq. 
John A. Purvis, Esq. 
Purvis, Gray, Schuetze & Gordon 
1050 Walnut Street, Suite 501 
Boulder, Colorado 80302 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
E. Scott Savage, Esq. 
Casey K. McGarvey, Esq. 
Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic & Savage 
Attorneys for Railroad Defendants 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Carrie Hale 
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RDWY:[RDWJCN]Y.2;6 
June 30f 1992 
A Surveillance Review was held at 10200 South and 3rd West in South 
Jordan at the D&RGW Railroad Crossing. 
Location: 10200 South 300 West in South Jordan 
AAR Railroad Crossing No, 254344R 
The following were in attendences 
Orlando Meira D&RGW Railroad 
Dik Laubsch FHWA 
Eric Cheng UDOT, Safety 
Lillian Witkowski UDOT, Safety 
James C Nelson * UDOT, Util. & RR 
Michael V Arambula UDOT, Util. Engn. 
Anthony Murphy South Jordan 
Dan Christensen Developer 
Mark Wilson Developer 
The following items were discussed: 
Reviewed the history of the existing 10200 South crossing and the 
various designs that have been done at the location. 
South Jordan's City Manager, Anthony Murphy, presented a new 
proposal that is part of South Jordan's Master Plan. The City plans 
on building a new road west of and parallel to the railroad tracks 
from 106th South to 94th South. The new road will tie into a Sandy 
City's road which connects to 90th South. This new road will 
provide access to the properties west of the tracks and eliminate 
several private railroad crossings. Then the road east of the 
railroad tracks that currently crosses the railraod tracks at 10200 
South will be extended on to the south to about 104th South on the 
east of the tracks and then it will cross the railroad at 90 
degeees on a new railroad crossing at approximately Railroad mile 
post 7 31. When this new crossing is complete, the city will close 
the existing access across the railroad tracks at 10200 South, 
which has a very bad crossing angle and poor sight distance. • 
It was also noted that South Jordan is working with UDOT and 
eventually plans to build a railroad underpass for 106th South 
which will eliminate the existing at-grade crossing on 106th South. 
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South Jordan City will start presenting their master plan to 
concerned groups and work with the developers to get the plan 
implemented. South JordanxCity will select a loction for the 104th 
South crossing of the tracks and notify UDOT when they wil^be 
ready to hold a Railroad Surveillance Review. 
Once the surveillance review has been held UDOT will prepare a 
matching fund agreement between UDOT and D&RGW RR and South Jordan -i 
City for the 6.75% matching fund cost. After the Matching Fund. 
Agreement is complete, UDOT will prepare an agreement with .the 
railroad for the design and installation of Automatic Flashing 
Light Signals and Gates. 
At a future date, the City in conjunction with UDOT will develope 
a grade separation for the railroad overpassing 106th South. 
All attending the meeting agreed to the proposed plan. 
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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
Norman H. Bangerter 
• »<»*trnor 
jene H. Findlav. C.P.A. 
£xtcuiiv« Oirtcter 
J«ne aturzeneager. ?.£. 
A M H S U M Director 
•Sheldon McConkie 
0i5tn« Director 
samuti J. Tavlor 
«.h airman 
w
* y n t :>. Winters 
V**t Chairman 
R. Lavaun Cox 
Todd C. Weston 
•James G. Larkm 
Elvt H. Anderson 
May 21, 1990 
Mayor Theron B. Hutchings 
City of South Jordan 
11175 South Redwood Road 
South Jordan,-Utah 84065 
Attention: Richard N. Varne, City Administrator 
Dear Mayor Hutchings, 
SUBJECT: Railroad Grade Crossing Diagnostic Review of the D&RG 
Railroad Crossing No. 254-344R at approximately 10200 
South and 3rd West in South Jordan City 
In accordance with Utah Department of Transportation Policy 
and Procedure, it was determined'that the railroad crossing noted 
above and shown on the attached map be evaluated by the UD0T 
Railroad Grade Crossing Diagnostic Review Team. 
Representatives from South Jordan, UDOT and the Federal 
Highway Administration met at the site on April 11, 1990 to 
discuss the project concept. From this meeting, two options were 
recommended: 
1, To leave the existing crossing in place on the current 
alignment and simply install new signals, gates and barriers on 
the east s ide, or 
2. To combine two crossings at location on 10000 South and 
continue the frontage .road through 10200 South to 10000 South. 
Combining the two crossings would be a benefit to South 
Jordan City but would require a substantial investment. The 
approximate cost of such a project, not including right of way 
and environmental clearances, would be $300,000. South Jordan 
City's participating share at ten percent would be $30,000. The 
City would also need to secure right of way and environmental 
clearances. ^ T E P O S ! T ! O N 
EXHIBIT 
in eouai oooot iwwv tfrrwov* 
0529 
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C i t y o f S o u t h J o r d a n 
May 2 1 , L990 
Page 2 
To l e a v e t h e e x i s t i n g c r o s s i n g i n p l a c e t h e f o l l o w i n g i t e m s 
w o u l d n e e d t o be i n s t a l l e d a t t h e r a i l r o a d c r o s s i n g : 
1. F l a s h i n g Light S i g n a t s 
2 . Automatic Cates 
3. Install barrier (80 feet) on the outside of the curve 
east of the track and adjacent to 1-15. 
4. Install railroad advance warning signs and relocate 
stop signs, and crossbucks. 
Since- 10200 South at 300 West is a City Street, South Jordan 
City..will be 'responsible to install the railroad advance warning 
signs and relocate the stop signs, crossbucks and install the 80 
feet of barrier. 
Before UDOT can proceed to authorize funding for the 
automatic gates and flashing light signals at the crossing, a 
lecter of commitment is required from South Jordan City agreeing 
to participate in the project with ten percent matching funds to 
cover part of the installation cost and to provide the above 
noted items on the City streets. 
The estimated cost of the project will be about $130,000. 
South Jordan City's participating share will be about $13,000. 
The final agreement will reflect the actual cost. 
UDOT assumes that South Jordan City has decided to leave che 
existing crossing intact at 10200 South since we have not been 
contacted about the new alignment or about a commitment tc obtain 
right of way. To avoid any further delays and risks regarding 
liability for accidents at the crossing, we encourage che City's 
commitment to participate in the automatic gates and flashing 
light signals. 
UDOT will proceed to prepare a Design Study Report and 
request approval for preliminary engineering from the Federal 
Highway Administration for the Railroad to prepare detail plans 
and estimates for the railroad force account work. After 
approval is received and plans are prepared by che Railroad, UDOT 
will* prepare formal agreements wjlth the Railroad Company for 
installing the flashing light signals and automatic gates. Also, 
we will prepare a cooperative agreement with South Jordan City 
for deposit of matching funds. The railroad agreement will Chen 
be submitted to the Federal Highway Administration requesting 
authorization to proceed with the work. 
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Cicv of Souch Jordan 
Hay-21. 1990 
Page 3 
Afcer UDOT receives auchorizacion co proceed wich che work 
from che FHWA, che railroad agreemenc will be submicced co che 
Railroad Company and che matching fund agreemenc will be 
submicced co che Cicy of Souch-Jordan co be executed. UDOT looks 
forward co working wich che Cicy co improve chis railroad 
crossing. If you have any questions, please concacc my office ac 
any cime (801) 965-4176. 
Very cruly yours, 
James C. Nelson, P. E. 
Engineering Coordinacor 
Attachments 
JCN/SVJ/gj 
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TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION 
•Samuei J. Taylor 
Chairman 
Wayne 6. Winters 
Vice Chairman 
Todd C. Weston 
•James G. Larkin 
John T. Dunlop 
Elva H. Anderson 
Secretary 
October 20, 1992 
City of South..Jordan 
Anthony Murphy 
11175 So. Redwood Road 
South Jordan, Utah 84065 
Dear Mr. Murphy, 
Reference is made our review of the railroad grade crossing at 10200 South, 
South Jordan. 
"t has been noted that the railroad grade crossing requires Advance Warning 
^igns and pavement markings to be installed. Please be advised that all 
signing and pavement markings are the responsibility of the local authority 
and should be installed prior to relocation of the crossing, and this office 
should be notified upon completion. 
After completion of the Federally funded project the signs should be moved to 
the new location at approximately 10500 South and the existing old crossing 
will be closed. 
Thank you for your interest in safety. 
Sincerely, 
Mack 0. Christensen 
Traffic & Safety Studies Engineer 
MOC/LWitkowski/cdf 
cc: Jim Nelson 
Mike Arambula 
Eric Cheng 
Dick Laubsch, FHWA 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
Eugene H. Findlay, GRA. 
Execuove Dinxwr ^501 South 2700 West 
toward H. Richardson. RE. Salt Lake City. Utah 84119-5998 
.Assistant Otrecur '801) 965-4000 
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be: Clair L. Hendrickson, FHWA 
Orlando Miera, Field Engineer, SPTC 
Michael V. Arambula, Roadway Design 
Gerald Bartschi, Roadway Design 
Bob Charlesworth, Region 2 
Lillian Witkowski, Safety 
Steve Reitz, Internal Audit 
October 18, 1995 
Mr, Bob N. Price, Manager Public Services 
Southern Pacific Transportation Company 
1200 Corporate Center Drive 
Monterey Park, California 91754-7605 
SUBJECT: November 16, 1995 Coordinating Meeting 
Dear Bob: 
The next meeting between the Utah Department of Transportation 
and the South Pacific Transportation Company is scheduled for 
November 16, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. in the UDOT*Complex in the 4th Floor 
Roadway Design Conference Room, at 4501 South 2700 West, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 
Attached is a copy of the Agenda and Railroad Status Report 
for the next meeting to be held on November 16, 1995. We look 
forward to meeting with you. 
Sincerely yours, 
James C. Nelson, P. E. 
Engineering Coordinator, 
Utilities and Railroads 
J:\WPFILES\RRCMTG\D&RGW\111695 
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October 18, 1995 
Mr. Bob N. Price, Manager Public Services 
Southern Pacific Transportation Company 
1200 Corporate Center Drive 
Monterey Park, 'California 91754-7605 
SUBJECT: November 16# 1995 Coordinating Meeting 
Dear Bob: 
The next meeting between the Utah Department of Transportation 
and the South Pacific Transportation Company is scheduled for 
November 16, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. in the UDOT Complex in the 4th Floor 
Roadway Design Conference Room, at 4501 South 2700 West, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
Attached is a copy of the Agenda and Railroad Status Report 
for the next meeting to be held on November 16, 1995. We look 
forward to meeting with you. 
Sincerely yours, 
James C. Nelson, P. E. 
Engineering Coordinator, 
Utilities and Railroads 
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AGENDA 
Review the 1994 Projects. 
1994 Projects 
A. AAR 254630W, RRP-LC35(84), 9th South 650 West 
in Salt Lake City. 
Will install the Constant Warning Device on 
August 14# 1995. 
B. AAR 254773U, RRP-STP-LC35(92), 4800 South 180 
West in Murray. 
SPTC reported they are waiting for the control 
panel. It will be here in a few weeks and 
should be installed in late September, 1995. 
What is the current status. 
C. AAR 254900T, STP-LC49 (15) , 6400 North 5000 
West in Am-Fk. 
SPTC has been authorized to proceed with the 
construction of the crossing. SPTC reported 
the material has been ordered. 
What is the current Status. 
D AAR 254905C, RRP-STP-LC49 (14) ,'* 4th South East 
of SR-114, near Orem. 
The crossing material and signal 
equipment was installed on May 17, 
1995. A Final inspection was 
scheduled for August 8, 1995. 
What is the current status. 
Review the list of proposed projects scheduled for 1995 
and 1997. 
1995 Design Project's 
A. AAR 254340N, STP-007K )2, T2300 South 500 
West on Draper Road in Riverton. 
Plans were sent to SPTC authorizing them to * 
proceed with the preparation of their plans 
and estimate. SPTC reported the plans and 
estimate will be sent to UDOT in Two 
weeks(August 18, 1995). 
What is the current status. 
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AAR 254344R, STP-LC35(76) , 10200 South 300 
West in South Jordan. 
The I-15/Railroad Study is complete. An 
overpass will be placed at 106th South. When 
the new railroad Grade and the 106th South 
overpass is complete, an AT-Grade Crossing 
will be placed at about 104th or 105th south 
and the 10200 South crossing will be Closed. 
Until then, this project is on hold. 
Any update on the status of the project. 
AAR 254347L, STP-0209(8)7, 90th South .1-15. 
A Surveillance Review was held on May 11, 
1993. Since that time an I-15/Railroad Study 
has been completed. The I-15/Railroad Study 
has determined a railroad underpass will be 
constructed at 90th South to replace the At-
Grade Crossing. 
A supplemental surveillance was held at the 
90th South At-Grade Crossing because there 
have been a number of crashes that have 
resulted in a death and a number of injuries. 
The accidents are being caused from traffic 
backing up at the Traffic Signals to the east 
and west of the crossing and motorists are 
being trapped on the crossing with no way to 
get off the tracks. It was decided to do an 
interim project and preempt the traffic 
signals so the tracks can. be cleared before 
the trains come. SPTC has submitted the design 
for the Preemption system. The agreement is 
complete and the "Notice of Intended Action 
has been advertised. 
What is the current status. 
AAR 254742V, STP-LC49 ( ), 5400 South 1700 East 
in Springville. • 
A Surveillance Review was held on 
May 10, 1993. A Surveillance Report 
was issued on June 27, 1993. No 
further action will be taken at this 
time. Any change in stattfs. 
AAR 254760T, STP-LC49 ( ), 5400 South 1600 East 
in Springville. 
A Surveillance Review was held on May 10, 
1993. A Surveillance Report was issued on June 
27, 1993. No other action required at this 
time. 
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recommended speed on a turn to be 30 MPH or less, and this 
recommended speed is equal to or less than the speed limit established by 
f law or by regulation for that section of highway. Where a Turn sign is 
warranted, a Large Arrow sign (sec. 2C-9) may be used on the outside of 
the turn. Additional protection may be provided by use of the Advisory 
Speed plate (sec. 2C-35). 
W1-1R 
30"x 30" 
W1-2R 
30"x 30" 
c 
2C-5 Curve Sign (Wl-2) 
The Curve sign (W1-2R or 2L) may be used where engineering 
investigations of roadway, geometric, and operating conditions show the 
recommended speed on the curve to be greater than 30 miles per hour and 
equal to or less than the speed limit established by law or by regulation for 
that section of highway. Additional protection may be provided by use of 
the Advisory Speed plate (sec. 2C-35). 
Editorial 
Change 
Rev. 4 
2C-6 Reverse Turn Sign (Wl-3) 
The Reverse Turn sign is intended for use to mark two turns or a curve l Editorial 
and a turn in opposite directions as defined in the warrants for Turn and I ^ " A * 
Curve signs (sees. 2C-4 and 5) that are separated by a tangent of less than 
600 feet. If the first turn is to the right, a Right Reverse Turn sign(W 1-3R) 
shall be used and if the first turn is to the left, a Left Reverse Turn sign 
(W1-3L) shall be used. 
c 
W1-3R 
30"x 30" 
W1-4R 
30"x 30" 
2C-3 Rev. 3/86 
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8B-3 Railroad Advance Warning Signs (W10-1, 2, 3, 4) 
A Railroad Advance Warning (W10-1) sign shall be used on each road-
way in advance of every grade crossing except: 
1. On low-volume, low-speed roadways crossing minor spurs or other 
tracks that are infrequently used and which are flagged by train crews. 
2. In the business districts of urban areas where active grade crossing 
traffic control devices are in use. 
3. Where physical conditions do not permit even a partially effective 
display of the sign. 
Placement of the sign shall be in accordance with Table II-1, Section 
2C-3 and Sections 2A-21 to 2A-27, except in residential or business 
districts where low speeds are prevalent, the signs may be placed a 
minimum distance of 100 feet from the crossing. On divided highways and 
one-way roads, it is desirable to erect an additional sign on the left side of 
the roadway. 
The W10-2, 3, and 4 signs may be installed on highways that are parallel 
to railroads. The purpose of these signs is to warn a motorist making a 
turn that a railroad crossing is ahead. Where there is 100 feet or more 
between the railroad and the parallel highway, a W10-1 sign should be in-
stalled in advance of the railroad crossing and the W10-2, 3, or 4 signs on 
the parallel highway would not be necessary. 
Vlll-12(c) 
Rev. 5 
W10-1 
36" Diameter 
(. 
W10-2 
30" x 30" 
W10-3 
30" x 30" 
W10-4 
30" x 30" 
VIII-2 (c) 
Rev. 2 
8B-3 
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8B-4 Pavement Markings 
Pavement markings in advance of a grade crossing shall consist of an X, 
the letters RR, a no passing marking (2-lane roads), and certain transverse 
lines. Identical markings shall be placed in each approach lane on all 
paved approaches to grade crossings where grade crossing signals or 
automatic gates are located, and at all other grade crossings where the 
prevailing speed of highway traffic is 40 mph or greater. When used, a 
portion of the pavement marking symbol should be directly opposite the 
advance warning sign. If needed, supplemental pavement marking sym-
bol^) may be placed between the advance warning sign and the crossing. 
The markings shall also be placed at crossings where the engineering 
studies indicate there is a significant potential conflict between vehicles 
and trains. At minor crossings or in urban areas, these markings may be 
omitted if engineering study indicates that other devices installed provide 
suitable control. 
The design of railroad crossing pavement markings shall be essentially 
as illustrated in figure 8-2. The symbols and letters are elongated to allow 
for the low angle at which they are viewed. All markings shall be 
reflectorized white except for the no-passing markings which shall be 
reflectorized yellow. 
8B-5 Illumination at Grade Crossings 
At grade crossings where a substantial amount of railroad operation is 
conducted at night, particularly where train speeds are low, where cross-
ings are blocked for long periods, or accident history indicates that 
motorists experience difficulty in seeing trains or control devices during 
the hours of darkness, illumination at and adjacent to the crossing may be 
installed to supplement other traffic control devices where an engineering 
analysis determines that better visibility of the train is needed. Regardless 
of the presence of other control devices, illumination will aid the motorist 
in observing the presence of railroad cars on a crossing where the gradient 
of the vehicular approaches is such that the headlights of an oncoming 
vehicle shine under or over the cars. 
Recommended types and location of luminaires for grade crossing 
illumination are contained in the American National Standard Practice for 
Roadway Lighting, RP8.* In any event, luminaires shall be so located and 
light therefrom so directed as to not interfere with aspects of the railroad 
signal system and not interfere with the field of view of members of the 
locomotive crew. 
8B-6 Exempt Crossing Signs (R15-3, WlO-la) 
When authorized by law or regulation a supplemental sign (R15-3) 
bearing the word EXEMPT may be used below the Crossbuck and Track 
• Available from the Illuminating Engineering Society, New York, N.Y. 10017. 
8B-5 
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CD 
Stop line approximately 8* 
from gate (if present) 
Width may vary according to lane width. 
t When used, a portion of the 
pavement marking symbol should be 
directly opposite the Advance 
Warning Sign (W10-1). If needed, 
supplemental pavement marking 
symbol(s) may be placed .between the 
Advance Warning Sign and the 
crossing, but should be at least 50 
feet from the Stop Line. 
A three lane roadway should be marked with a 
centerline for two-lane approach operation on 
the approach to a crossing. 
On multi-lane roads the transverse bands 
should extend across all approach lanos, and 
individual RXR symbols should be used in 
each approach lane. 
Refer to Standard Alphabet for Highway Signs 
and Markings for RXR symbols details. 
Figure 8-2. Typical placement of warning signs and pavement markings at railroad-highway grade crossings. 
r **\ 
**.^ :. 
V 
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2C-15 Stop Ahead Sign (W3-1) 
A STOP AHEAD sign is intended for use on an approach to a STOP 
sign that is not visible for a sufficient distance to permit the driver to bring 
his vehicle to a stop at the STOP sign. Obstruction(s) causing the limited 
visibility may be permanent or intermittent. 
The STOP AHEAD sign shall be a minimum of 30 X 30 inches. 
In some cases, it may be used for emphasis where there is poor 
observance of the STOP sign. 
The word message STOP AHEAD sign (W3-1) may be used as an 
alternate to the symbol sign (W3-la). 
W3-1a W3-2a 
36"x 36" 36"x 36" 
2C-16 Yield Ahead Sign (W3-2) 
A YIELD AHEAD sign is intended for use on an approach to a YIELD 
sign that is not visible for a sufficient distance to permit the driver to bring 
his vehicle to a stop at the YIELD sign. Obstruction(s) causing the limited 
visibility may be permanent or intermittent. 
The YIELD AHEAD sign shall be a minimum of 30 x 30 inches. 
The word message YIELD AHEAD sign (W3-2) may be used as an 
alternate to the symbol sign (W3-2a). 
2C-17 Signal Ahead Sign (W3-3) 
A Signal Ahead sign is intended for use in advance of any signalized 
location where physical conditions prevent drivers from having a 
continuous view of at least two signal indications for distance specified in 
section 4B-12. 
2C-8 
W3-3 
36"x 36" c 
II-85 (c) 
Rev. 5 
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B. SIGNS AND MARKINGS 
8B-1 Purpose 
Passive traffic control systems, consisting of signs, pavement markings, 
and grade crossing illumination, identify and direct attention to the 
location of a grade crossing. They permit vehicle operators and 
pedestrians to take appropriate action. 
Where railroad tracks have been abandoned or their use discontinued, 
all related signs and markings shall be removed. A sign, TRACKS OUT 
OF SERVICE (R8-9) may be installed until the tracks are removed or 
covered (see Section 8B-10). 
8B-2 Railroad Crossing (Crossbuck) Sign (R15-1, 2) 
The railroad crossing sign, a regulatory sign, commonly identified as the 
"crossbuck" sign, as a minimum shall be white reflectorized sheeting or 
equal, with the words RAILROAD CROSSING in black lettering. As a 
minimum, one crossbuck sign shall be used on each roadway approach to 
every grade crossing, alone or in combination with other traffic control 
devices. If there are two or more tracks between the signs, the number of 
tracks shall be indicated on an auxiliary sign of inverted T shape mounted 
below the crossbuck in the manner and at the heights indicated in figure 
8-1 except that use of this auxiliary sign is optional at crossings with 
automatic gates. 
Where physically feasible and visible to approaching traffic the 
crossbuck sign shall be installed on the right hand side of the roadway on 
each approach to the crossing. Where an engineering study finds restricted 
sight distance or unfavorable road geometry, crossbuck signs shall be 
placed back to back or otherwise located so that two faces are displayed to 
that approach. 
Crossbuck signs should be located with respect to the roadway 
pavement or shoulder in accordance with the criteria in sections 2A-21 
through 2A-27 and figures 2-1 and 2-2 (pages 2A-9 and 2A-10) and 
should be located with respect to the nearest track in accordance with 
signal locations in figure 8-7, (page 8C-6). The normal lateral clearances 
(sec. 2A-24), 6 feet from the edge of the highway shoulder or 12 feet from 
the edge of the traveled way in rural areas and 2 feet from the face of the 
curb in urban areas will usually be attainable. Where unusual conditions 
demand, variations determined by good judgment should provide the best 
possible combination of view and safety clearances attainable, 
occasionally utilizing a location on the left-hand side of the roadway. 
Appropriate details of R15-1 and R15-2 are available in Standard 
Highway Signs. * 
* Available from GPO 
8B-1 
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T R A C K S 
M 5 - 1 
48" x 9" 
(drilled for 90-degree mounting) 
R15-2 
9" x 9" 
27" x 9" 
* HEIGHT MAY BE VARIED 
AS REQUIRED BY LOCAL 
CONDITIONS. 
-ROADWAY LEVEL 
Figurw 8-1. Railroad-highway crossing (crottbuck) sign. 
8B-2 
C 
c 
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STOP 
R1-1 
30"x 30" 
4-WAYMALL WAY| 
Rl-3 
12"x6" 
R1-4 
18"x6" 
( 
2B-4 Stop Sign (Rl-1) 
STOP signs are intended for use where traffic is required to stop. The 
STOP sign shall be an octagon with white message and border on a red 
background. The standard size shall be 30 x 30 inches. Where greater 
emphasis or visibility is required, a larger size is recommended. On low-
volume local streets and secondary roads with low approach speeds, a 24 
x 24 inch size may be used. 
At a multiway stop intersection (sec. 2B-6), a supplementary plate 
(Rl-3) should be mounted just below each STOP sign. If the number of 
approach legs to the intersection is three or more, the numeral on the 
supplementary plate shall correspond to the actual number of legs, or the 
legend ALL-WAY (Rl-4) may be used. The supplementary plate shall 
have white letters on a red background and shall have a standard size of 12 
x 6 inches (Rl-3) or 18 x 6 inches (Rl-4). 
A STOP sign beacon or beacons may be used in conjunction with a 
STOP sign as described in section 4E-4. 
Secondary messages shall not be used on STOP sign faces. 
2B-5 Warrants for Stop Sign 
Because the STOP sign causes a substantial inconvenience to motorists, 
it should be used only where warranted. A STOP sign may be warranted at 
an intersection where one or more of the following conditions exist: 
.1. Intersection of a less important road with a main road where 
application of the normal right-of-way rule is unduly hazardous. 
2. Street entering a through highway or street. 
3. Unsignalized intersection in a signalized area. 
4. Other intersections where a combination of high speed, restricted 
view, and serious accident record indicates a need for control by the STOP 
sign. 
Prior to the application of these warrants, consideration should be given I 
to less restrictive measures, such as the YIELD sign (2B-7) where a full I 
c 
Rev. 9/84 2B-2 
11-48 {ct 
Rev. 3 
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stop is not necessary at all times. Periodic reviews of existing installations 
may be desirable to determine whether, because of changed conditions, 
the use of less restrictive control or no control could accommodate traffic 
demands safely and more effectively. 
STOP signs should never be used on the through roadways of 
expressways. Properly designed expressway interchanges provide for the 
continuous flow of traffic, making STOP signs unnessary even on the 
entering roadways. Where at-grade intersections are temporarily justified 
for local traffic in sparsely populated areas, STOP signs should be used on 
the entering roadways to protect the through traffic. STOP signs may also 
be required at the end of diverging roadways at the intersection with other 
highways not designed as expressways. In most of these cases, the speeds 
will not warrant any great increase in the sign sizes. 
STOP signs shall not be erected at intersections where traffic control 
signals are operating. The conflicting commands of two types of control 
devices are confusing. If traffic is required to stop when the operation of 
the stop-and-go signals is not warranted, the signals should be put on 
flashing operation with the red flashing light facing the traffic that must 
stop. 
Where two main highways intersect, the STOP sign or signs should 
normally be posted on the minor street to stop the lesser flow of traffic. 
Traffic engineering studies, however, may justify a decision to install a 
STOP sign or signs on the major street, as at a three-way intersection 
where safety considerations may justify stopping the greater flow of 
traffic to permit a left-turning movement. 
STOP signs may be used at selected railroad-highway grade crossings 
only after their need has been determined by a detailed traffic engineering 
study. Use of the STOP sign at railroad-highway grade crossings is 
described in Section 8B-9. 
Portable or part-time STOP signs shall not be used except for 
emergency purposes. Also, STOP signs should not be used for speed 
control. 
2B-6 Multiway Stop Signs 
The "Multiway Stop" installation is useful as a safety measure at some 
locations. It should ordinarily be used only where the volume of traffic on 
the intersecting roads is approximately equal. A traffic control signal is 
more satisfactory for an intersection with a heavy volume of traffic. 
Any of the following conditions may warrant a multiway STOP sign 
installation (sec. 2B-4): 
1. Where traffic signals are warranted and urgently needed, the 
multiway stop is an interim measure that can be installed quickly to 
control traffic while arrangements are being made for the signal 
installation. 
2B-3 Rev. 9/84 
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( 
the road on the near or far side of the grade crossing, whichever provides 
better visibility to the motorist to observe the sign and be able to comply 
with its message. On multi-lane roads and one-way roadways a second sign 
may be placed on the near or far left side to the grade crossing to further 
improve visibility. Placement of the R8-8 sign(s) should be determined as 
part of the engineering study. 
VIII-11 (c) 
Rev. 5 
c 
c 
8B-9 STOP Signs at Grade Crossings (Rl-1, W3-1) 
The use of the STOP signs at railroad-highway grade crossings shall be 
limited to those grade crossings selected after need is established by a 
detailed traffic engineering study. Such crossings should have the follow-
ing characteristics: 
1. Highway should be secondary in character with low traffic counts. 
2. Train traffic should be substantial. 
3. Line of sight to an approaching train is restricted by physical 
features such that approaching traffic is required to reduce speed to 10 
miles per hour or less in order to stop safely. 
4. At the stop bar, there must be sufficient sight distance down the 
track to afford ample time for a vehicle to cross the track before the 
arrival of the train. 
The engineering study may determine other compelling reasons for the 
need to install a STOP sign, however, this should only be an interim 
measure until active traffic control signals can be installed. STOP signs 
shall not be used on primary through highways or at grade crossings with 
active traffic control devices. 
Whenever a STOP sign is installed at a grade crossing, a Stop Ahead 
sign shall be installed in advance of the STOP sign. 
8B-10 Tracks Out of Service Sign (R8-9) 
The TRACKS OUT OF SERVICE sign (R8-9) is intended for use at a 
crossing in lieu of the Railroad Crossing sign (R15-1, 2) when a railroad 
track has been abandoned or its use discontinued. This sign (R8-9) shall be 
removed when the tracks have been removed or covered. 
VIII-5 (c) 
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R8-9 
24" x 24* 
8B-7 
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May 21, 1990 
Mayor Theron B. Hutchings 
City of South Jordan 
11175 South Redwood Road 
South Jordan, Utah 84065 
Attention: Richard N. tfarne, City Administrator 
Dear Mayor Hutchings, 
SUBJECT: Railroad Grade Crossing Diagnostic Review of the D&RG 
Railroad Crossing No. 254-344R at approximately 10200 
South and 3rd West in South Jordan City 
In accordance with Utah Department of Transportation Policy 
and Procedure, it was determined * that the railroad crossing noted 
above and shown on the attached map be evaluated by the UDOT 
Railroad Grade Crossing Diagnostic Review Team. 
Representatives from South Jordan, UDOT and the Federal 
Highway Administration met at the site on April 11, 1990 to 
discuss the project concept. From this meeting, two options were 
recommended: 
1. To leave the existing crossing in place on the current 
alignment and simply install new signals, gates and barriers on 
the east s ide, or 
2. To combine two crossings at location on 10000 South and 
continue the frontage road through 10200 South to 10000 South. 
Combining the two crossings would be a benefit to South 
Jordan City but would require a substantial investment. The 
approximate cost of such a project, not including right of way 
and environmental clearances, would be $300,000. South Jordan 
City's participating share at ten percent would be $30,000. The 
City would also need to secure right of way and environmental 
clearances. ^TSSsffloN 
EXHIBIT 
«n «ouai oooorcufltiv #mo«ov«» 
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City of South Jordan 
May 21, L990 
Page 2 
To leave the existing crossing in place the following items 
would need to be installed at the railroad crossing: 
1. F l a s h i n g L ight S i g n a t s 
2 . Automatic Gates 
3. Install barrier (80 feet) on the outside of the curve 
east of the track and adjacent to 1-15. 
4. Install railroad advance warning signs and relocate 
stop signs, and crossbucks. 
Since 10200 South at 300 West is a City Street, South Jordan 
City..will be responsible to install the railroad advance warning 
signs and relocate the stop signs, crossbucks and install the 80 
feet of barrier. 
Before UDOT can proceed to authorize funding for the 
automatic gates and flashing light signals at the crossing, a 
letter of commitment is required from South Jordan City agreeing 
to participate in the project with ten percent matching funds co 
cover part of the installation cost and to provide the above 
noted items on the City streets. 
The estimated cost of the project will be about $130,000. 
South Jordan City's participating share will be about $13,000. 
The final agreement will reflect the actual cost. 
UDOT assumes that South Jordan City has decided to leave the 
existing crossing intact at 10200 South since we have not been 
contacted about the new alignment or about a commitment to obtain 
right of way. To avoid any further delays and risks regarding 
liability for accidents at the crossing, we encourage the City's 
commitment to participate in the automatic gates and flashing 
light signals. 
UDOT will proceed to prepare a Design Study Report and 
request approval for preliminary engineering from the Federal 
Highway Administration for the Railroad to prepare detail plans 
and estimates for the railroad force account work. After 
approval is received and plans are prepared by the Railroad, UDOT 
will prepare formal agreements with the Railroad Company for 
installing the flashing light signals and automatic gates. Also, 
we will prepare a cooperative agreement with South Jordan City 
for deposit of matching funds. The railroad agreement will Chen 
be submitted to the Federal Highway Administration requesting 
authorization co proceed with the work. 
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crossing. If you have any questions, pieas 
any cime (801) 965-4176. 
Very truly yours, 
James C. Nelson, P. E. 
Engineering Coordinator 
Attachments 
JCN/SVJ/gj 
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RDWY:[RDWJCN]Y.2;4 
April 13, 1992 
Location: South Jordan City Offices 
11175 So- Redwood Road 
South Jordan City, Utah 
Subject Ref: 10200 So & D&RGW Railroad Crossing 
The following were in attendence: 
Anthony Murphy 
Orlando Miera 
Donald W. Killmore 
Tom Smith 
Eric Cheng 
Michael V Arambula 
James C Nelson 
So. Jordan City Administrater 254-3742 
Southern Pacific Trans. Co. 974-9253 
Area Engineer, FHWA 524-5142 
Asst. Dist Two Director 975-4806 
Traffic Engineer, Safety 975-4284 
Railroad and Utilities 965-4813 
Engineering Coordinator Util & RR 965-4176 A brief discussion was given regarding he number of years South 
Jordan City and UDOT have tried to get the railroad crossing at 
10200 South across the D&RGW Railroad tracks improved with 
Automatic Flashing Light Signals and Gates. 
South Jordan City has now come up with a New Master Road Plan for 
the area which if approved would change the concept for the 
proposed railroad crossing at 10200 South. 
Tony Murphy, South Jordan's City Administrator reviewed the master 
plan which calls for the consolidation of two private railroad 
crossings at 98th and 100th South into one private crossing near 
100th South. The highway/railway crossing at 10200 South would be 
deleted and a new crossing placed at about 104th South. 
The crossing at 104th South would only serve local industrial 
properties and would not serve as a local frontage road. A new 
frontage road would be delveloped west of the railroad tracks and 
it would act as a frontage road between 90th South and 106th South 
and would provide access to the properties that had access over the 
railroad tracks. The frontage road east of the tracks that crossed 
the tracks at 10200 South would have the railroad crossing closed 
and the frontage road would be extended south to provide access to 
about 104th south for the industrial area and then cross the .D&RGW 
Tracks at about 104th South. 
UDOT will work with South Jordan City to develope a grade 
intersection on 106th South for South Jordan City's newly proposed 
north south road west of the tracks connecting 106th So. and 90th 
South. South Jordan City is to contact John Maurer at UDOT's 
District two offices to coordinate the new intersection design. 
nm? 
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South Jordan City will start presenting their master plan to 
concerned groups and work with the developers to get the plan 
implemented. South Jordan^City will select a loction for the 104th 
South crossing of the tracks and notify UDOT when they wilj.^be 
ready to hold a Railroad Surveillance Review. 
Once the surveillance review has been held UDOT will prepare a 
matching fund agreement between UDOT and D&RGW RR and South Jordan 
City for the 6.75% matching fund cost. After the Matching Fund 
Agreement is complete, UDOT will prepare an agreement with .the 
railroad for the design and installation of Automatic Flashing 
Light Signals and Gates. 
At a future date, the City in conjunction with UDOT will develope 
a grade separation for the railroad overpassing 106th South. 
All attending the meeting agreed to the proposed plan. 
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*Y: [RDWJCN]Y.2;6 
ie 30, 1992 
Surveillance Review was held at 10200 South and 3rd West in South 
cdan at the DSRGW Railroad Crossing• 
cation: 10200 South 300 West in South Jordan 
AAR Railroad Crossing No. 254344R 
e following were in attendence: 
lando Meira 
k Laubsch 
ic Cheng 
llian Witkowski 
mes C Nelson 
chael V Arambula 
>thony Murphy 
JI Christensen 
irk Wilson 
D&RGW Railroad 
FHWA 
UDOT, Safety 
UDOT, Safety 
UDOT, Util. & RR 
UDOT, Util. Engn, 
South Jordan 
Developer 
Developer 
Le following items were discussed: 
^viewed the history of the existing 10200 South crossing and the 
irious designs that have been done at the location. 
Duth Jordan's City Manager, Anthony Murphy, presented a new 
coposal that is part of South Jordan's Master Plan. The City plans 
i building a new road west of and parallel to the railroad tracks 
rom 106th South to 94th South. The new road will tie into a Sandy 
Lty's road which connects to 90th South. This new road will 
rovide access to the properties west of the tracks and eliminate 
everal private railroad crossings. Then the road east of the 
ailroad tracks that currently crosses the railraod tracks at 10200 
outh will be extended on to the south to about 104th South on the 
ast of the tracks and then it will cross the railroad at 90 
egeees on a new railroad crossing at approximately Railroad mile 
ost 731. When this new crossing is complete, the city will close 
he existing access across the railroad tracks at 10200 South, 
rhich has a very bad crossing angle and poor sight distance. -
;t was also noted that South Jordan is working with UDOT and 
eventually plans to build a railroad underpass for 106th South 
rhich will eliminate the existing at-grade crossing on 106th South. 
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The following items were agreed to by FHWAf UDOT and South Jordan• 
1. The road extention east of the railroad tracks at 10200 South 
to the new railroad crossing at about 10400 South and then on west 
across the tracks to South Jordan's newly proposed north-south road 
will be built by South Jordan and their developers. 
2. Federal Railroad Safety Funds will be used to provide 
Automatic Flashing Light Signals, Gates, Constant Motion Detection 
and new rubber crossing materials. 
3. South Jordan will place passive warning devices at the 
existing 10200 South crossing and will then move them to the new 
crossing at 10400 South when they close the existing crossing. 
4. South Jordan City will provide UDOT with a letter agreeing to 
participate in the project with the 6.67% matching funds and agree 
to have the new road built by the time the new railroad active 
warning devices are in place at the new crossing. 
5. The D&RGW Railroad agreed to have the new crossing nine (9) 
months after they are authorized to proceed with the construction 
of the project at approximately Railroad M.P. 731. 
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July 28, 1992 
UDOT/DPS Building, Fourth.Floor 
! Attn: James C. Nelson, P.E. 
4501 South 2700 West 
SLC,UT 84119 f ; 
'RE: -10200 Railroad Crossing ' " 
Dear Mr. Nelson: -: 
;. * '" 
'•/. 
This letter is interided to serve as a'confirmation of my understanding regarding 
plans to correct the dangerous railroad crossing at 10200 South in South Jordan 
city. , ; - . . ; } , J . . H . . : • ' i v ; . - • • • ; • • . • • • ; : • . : - : . - . . - • -•'.'••.:.:• •" • '-•• V~.v-i-~5-i- V.--- -
It is South Jordan Cityjs desire to eventually vacate the crossing at 10200 SoutlL"!. ; v . *". 
A public hearing has been scheduled for August 25', 1992 to_ac<J^t'j^bIic.\T>j;ii«-.: 
comment on a revision to the master street plan for'a'new frontage road in t n e ^ l ^ g R ' 
j area at approximately 400 br'500 West. The road will tie'into 500 West m ^ ^ j ^ ^ f 
-Sandy City" and reduce the need for rail crossings in. the area. Afthis time"! ^:sMfe^ 
can't commit to an exact time table for construction of the new frontage road but ^ S>t5ft r 
I expect it to be completed in phases over the next five years;' .. ; . : • ^ p § ^ S t ^ " 
The City has also coordinated with UDOT to include an underpass for 10600 . ? ; ^ ^ 
South to eliminate anticipated congestion problems at the 10600 South, • :i£;k:::\-
interchange. It is my understanding that-the underpass jvill beincluded on tfie .^£?V3?-v; -
vupcoming five-year plan. The underpass is critical to avoid problems sinuiarXcT '""^'-:;':. 
9000 South at this intersection.' •' ••':- * :.\ • ,:"; """">: :- " "*. '-'.'-' ' ^ ^ R ? f "r:v : ' 
The construction of the underpass and the new frontage roatf-willmake it ' '/* 
possible to eventually vacate "the. 10200 Southland other private crossings over ••:..<., 
the railroad. The City has proposed a new rail crossing at approximately 10500 . " • ;. 
SOUTH TORDAN 
::w 
yj 
111TC C ^ . — . O 
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10200 South Rail Crossing 
July 28, 1992 . • ' 
Page 2 , ' • . • 
South to provide, access to property east of the railroad and to. extend a minor 
frontage road to tie into the existing frontage road east of the railroad at 
approximately 10200 South. Access to the property east of the railroad from * 
10600 South may be closed in five years and it is important for the City to move 
ahead on this project. I have discussed the proposed Crossing with all but one 
of the affected property owners and there does not appear to be any opposition. • 
to the proposal. .'•- . . . . . . . 
I understand that the City will need to pay for a portion of the costs of the new 
crossing. I believe that the City is 'responsible for paying approximately 6 
percent of the total costs. The participation level is acceptable to the City.'. * 
Obviously a project of.this nature will take, some time to put together. I 
appreciate the desire that ybu have shown to work with lis on this item and I • 
-look forward to resolving, the dangerous crossing at 10200 South. As you 
recorrimended, we have completed the additional signage and warnings at-the . ^ 
crossing to temporarily help the situation. •; ' : /• . • • •£^-^{r'{y 
•;\i' 
Please contact me if there is addition information that you need or if you would 
like a progress report on our public hearings and planning for the area., :-• 
Sincerely, ' .- \ .'» •. •"• 
• Tony Murphy 
City Administrator 
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AGENDA 
Review the 1994 Projects. 
1994 Projects 
A. AAR 254630W, RRP-LC35(84), 9th South 650 West 
in Salt Lake City. 
Will install the Constant Warning Device on 
August 14, 1995. 
B. AAR 254773U, RRP-STP-LC35(92), 4800 South 180 
West in Murray. 
SPTC reported they are waiting for the control 
panel. It will be here in a few weeks and 
should be installed in late September, 1995. 
What is the current status. 
C. AAR 254900T, STP-LC49 (15) , 6400 North 5000 
West in Am-Fk. 
SPTC has been authorized to proceed with the 
construction of the crossing. SPTC reported 
the material has been ordered. 
What is the current Status. 
D AAR 254905C, RRP-STP-LC49(14) / 4th South East 
of SR-114, near Orem. 
The crossing material and signal 
equipment was installed on May 17, 
1995. A Final inspection was 
scheduled for August 8, 1995. 
What is the current status. * 
Review the list of proposed projects scheduled for 1995 
and 1997. 
1995 Design Projects 
A. AAR 254340N, STP-007K )2, T2300 South 500 
West on Draper Road in Riverton. 
Plans were sent to SPTC authorizing them to ' 
proceed with the preparation of their plans 
and estimate. SPTC reported the plans and 
estimate will be sent to UDOT in Two 
weeks(August 18, 1995). 
What is the current status. 
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AAR 254344R, STP-LC35(76), 10200 South 300 
West in South Jordan. 
The I-15/Railroad Study is complete- An 
overpass will be placed at 106th South. When 
the new railroad Grade and the 106th South 
overpass is complete, an AT-Grade Crossing 
will be placed at about 104th or 105th south 
and the 10200 South crossing will be Closed. 
Until then, this project is on hold. 
Any update on the status of the project. 
AAR 254347L, STP-0209(8)7, 90th South 1-15. 
A Surveillance Review was held on May 11, 
1993. Since that time an I-15/Railroad Study 
has been completed. The I-15/Railroad Study 
has determined a railroad underpass will be 
constructed at 90th South to replace the At-
Grade Crossing. 
A supplemental surveillance was held at the 
90th South At-Grade Crossing because there 
have been a number of crashes that have 
resulted in a death and a number of injuries. 
The accidents are being caused from traffic 
backing up at the Traffic Signals to the east 
and west of the crossing and motorists are 
being trapped on the crossing with no way to 
get off the tracks. It was decided to do an 
interim project and preempt the traffic 
signals so the tracks can be cleared before 
the trains come. SPTC has submitted the design 
for the Preemption system. The agreement is 
complete and the "Notice of Intended Action 
has been advertised. 
What is the current status. 
AAR 254742V, STP-LC49 ( ), 5400 South 1700 East 
in Springville. 
A Surveillance Review was held on 
May 10, 1993. A Surveillance Report 
was issued on June 27, 1993. No 
further action will be taken at this 
time. Any change in stattfs. 
AAR 254760T, STP-LC49 ( ), 5400 South 1600 East 
in Springville. 
A Surveillance Review was held on May 10, 
1993. A Surveillance Report was issued on June 
27, 1993. No other action required at this 
time. 
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be: Clair L. Hendrickson, FHWA 
Orlando Miera, Field Engineer, SPTC 
Michael V. Arambula, Roadway Design 
Gerald Bartschi, Roadway Design 
Bob Charlesworth, Region 2 
Lillian Witkowski, Safety 
Steve Reitz, Internal Audit 
October 18, 1995 
Mr, Bob N. Price, Manager Public Services 
Southern Pacific Transportation Company 
1200 Corporate Center Drive 
Monterey Park, California 91754-7605 
SUBJECT: November 16, 1995 Coordinating Meeting 
Dear Bob: 
The next meeting between the Utah Department of Transportation 
and the South Pacific Transportation Company is scheduled for 
November 16, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. in the UDOT*Complex in the 4th Floor 
Roadway Design Conference Room, at 4501 South 2700 West, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
Attached is a copy of the Agenda and Railroad Status Report 
for the next meeting to be held on November 16, 1995. We look 
forward to meeting with you. 
Sincerely yours, 
James C. Nelson, P. E. 
Engineering Coordinator, 
Utilities and Railroads 
J:\WPFILES\RRCMTG\D&RGW\111695 
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October 18, 1995 
Mr, Bob N. Price, Manager Public Services 
Southern Pacific Transportation Company 
1200 Corporate Center Drive 
Monterey Park, California 91754-760.5 
SUBJECT: November 16, 1995 Coordinating Meeting 
Dear Bob: 
The next meeting between the Utah Department of Transportation 
and the South Pacific Transportation Company is scheduled for 
November 16, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. in the UDOT Complex in the 4th Floor 
Roadway Design Conference Room, at 4501 South 2700 West, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
Attached is a copy of the Agenda and Railroad Status Report 
for the next meeting to be held on November 16, 1995. We look 
forward to meeting with you. 
Sincerely yours, 
James C. Nelson, P. E. 
Engineering Coordinator, 
Utilities and Railroads 
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